Moving in and Mobilizing: Gentrifiers and Local Political Participation

Allison Verrilli

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Abstract

Does gentrification shape local political participation? Prior research shows gentrification can demobilize long-term residents, but less is known about gentrifiers themselves. I argue that gentrifiers' positionality, privileged individuals moving into historically disinvested neighborhoods, motivates them to engage politically to reshape their surroundings. Using administrative voting records from Austin, TX, and Durham, NC, and a difference-in-differences design, I find that gentrifiers increase turnout after moving into gentrifying neighborhoods and vote at higher rates than both long-term residents of these neighborhoods and residents of more affluent areas. These patterns are racialized: the effects are driven by white gentrifiers, and are heightened among gentrifiers moving into more non-white neighborhoods. To explore potential mechanisms, I analyze community survey data from both cities which reveals that gentrifiers combine negative views of their neighborhoods with strong political efficacy. Overall, the results demonstrate how privilege and place interact to drive local political participation and reshape urban communities.

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Introduction

Over the past several decades, gentrification has transformed urban neighborhoods and the demography of cities writ large. As the forces of deindustrialization and globalization fueled a transition to service-oriented economies, metropolitan areas saw a rise in demand for urban living amidst an increasingly competitive housing market (Guerrieri, Hartley, and Hurst 2013; Couture et al. 2024; Blasius and Friedrichs 2019). This contributed to the movement of wealthier, often white residents, commonly referred to as gentrifiers, into previously disinvested and racially segregated spaces. Existing scholarship has documented gentrifier efforts to transform their new neighborhoods to match their standards of living through their consumption patterns (Grier and Perry 2018), social interactions (Hyra 2017), and demand for policing (Beck 2020; Laniyonu 2018; Verrilli 2025) but have thus far not investigated gentrifiers' explicitly political behavior. While community context has been shown to influence political mobilization, existing theories of political participation do not provide clear predictions regarding gentrifier political behavior or, more broadly, expectations for the political behavior of relatively privileged residents in less resourced spaces.

This article unpacks whether movement into gentrifying areas shapes political participation. It asks, do gentrifiers turnout at higher rates, particularly in local elections, after moving? After moving, is their likelihood of turnout greater relative to long-term residents of gentrifying neighborhoods and residents of more affluent areas? And what role does race play–is this behavior unique to white gentrifiers or shaped by the racial composition of gentrifying neighborhoods?

Canonical theories of local political participation provide conflicting predictions about the political behavior of gentrifiers. The correlation between socio-economic status and political participation is well documented (Verba and Norman 1972; Brady and Scholzman 1995; Leighley and Oser 2018) and particularly strong at the local level, where higher socio-economic status individuals can better navigate low-information electoral contests and fragmented, complex systems (Einstein, Glick, and Palmer 2019; Sahn 2024). Thus one

might expect high levels of participation for gentrifiers, who often hold college degrees and earn relatively higher incomes. However, alternative theories of participation highlight the influence of community ties, finding strong correlation between political participation and factors such as social capital, community embeddedness, and proximity to in-group members (Putnam 2000; Oliver 2001; Huckfeldt 1986; Wong 2008). Furthermore, research has found that residential mobility is negatively related to political participation in that it increases administrative burdens (Highton 2000) and weakens social capital, at least initially (Oishi et al. 2007; Ruef and Kwon 2016). Gentrifiers, as newer arrivals to their communities and distinct in many ways from existing residents, often have lower social cohesion or community embeddedness, leading to potentially lower levels of engagement. Taken together, these factors position gentrifiers at the crossroads of competing theories of political participation, making their level of local political engagement uncertain.

Race is also deeply consequential to both gentrification and political mobilization. Historical disinvestment and housing segregation in majority-Black urban neighborhoods created the conditions for contemporary gentrification, often resulting in predominantly white in-movers entering communities of color. Ethnographic research shows that white gentrifiers frequently self-select into more ethnically and racially diverse neighborhoods (Ellen and O'Regan 2011; Brown-Saracino 2009), yet they also tend to associate non-white neighborhoods with higher levels of disorder and danger (Parekh 2015; Hyra 2017). Theories of racial threat further suggest that white gentrifiers will perceive greater danger when living in proximity to non-white groups and respond politically (Enos 2016; Trounstine 2018; Hamel and Wilcox-Archuleta 2022). Thus, racial context may simulaneously attract gentrifiers to diverse neighborhoods while heightening perceived threat, leaving their political responses theoretically unclear.

Investigating gentrifier political participation is further complicated by the transient and spatially localized nature of gentrification, which makes it difficult to track individual-level behavior over time and even more challenging to identify causal effects of gentrifying contexts.

Existing studies have largely tested the relationship between gentrification and political participation indirectly, finding that displacement stemming from gentrification can decrease political participation among low-income voters if they lose their housing or diminish the political power of non-white racial groups (Chou and Dancygier 2021; Lee and Velez 2024). Knotts and Haspel (2006) test the relationship directly and find that long-standing voters in highly gentrified neighborhoods are less likely to vote relative to those in less gentrifying areas. However, due data constraints, they cannot isolate the effect of the gentrified neighborhoods themselves nor assess the political behavior of newcomers to gentrifying areas. Thus there remain no direct tests of the link between gentrifiers and political participation.

I argue that gentrifiers' positionality within previously disinvested spaces generates heightened levels of local electoral participation. Dissatisfied with the infrastructure and amenities around them and empowered by relative resource advantages, gentrifiers actively participate in politics, particularly at the local level, as a means of reshaping their new neighborhoods to meet their economic and cultural preferences. For white gentrifiers in predominantly non-white neighborhoods, turnout is even higher as racial stereotypes about the perceived disorder of majority Black or Latino neighborhoods contribute to high levels of participation. The historic disinvestment in gentrifying neighborhoods makes gentrifiers' political participation paramount to increasing investment and infrastructure within their neighborhood relative to similar individuals who do not move into gentrifying neighborhoods, while their economic resource advantages, and for white gentrifiers, racial privilege, result in greater participation relative to long-term residents within gentrifying neighborhoods.

To test my argument, I combine administrative voting records from Travis County, TX and Durham County, NC with American Community Survey (ACS) data from 2014-2022 to identify gentrifiers and other categories of urban residents and simultaneously trace their movement and voting behavior. Using a difference-in-differences design, I match gentrifiers with other movers based on when they moved, individual-level characteristics such as age and race, and the socio-economic characteristics of their pre-move neighborhoods to isolate

the effect of moving on local electoral participation. I find that moving into a gentrifying area increases the probability of voting in a local election for gentrifiers relative to other movers who move from similar places in the same year, but that this increase is largely driven by white gentrifiers. I then observe that gentrifiers are more likely to vote in local elections relative to long-term residents of gentrifying neighborhoods and residents of more affluent neighborhoods. Finally, I find find further evidence that these results are racialized as the likelihood of gentrifier turnout increases after moving into more heavily Black and Latino neighborhoods. To explore the mechanisms behind this behavior, I use community survey data from Austin and Durham and find that gentrifiers hold more negative evaluations about the conditions in their neighborhood while also demonstrating a high likelihood of contacting local government. Taken together these findings demonstrate how privileged residents respond to perceived neighborhood disadvantage with heightened political engagement.

This paper contributes theoretically and empirically to understanding how gentrification unfolds from the bottom up. Heightened political engagement by gentrifiers may act as an accelerant to the gentrification process driving increased government attention and investment in response to a growing and active voting bloc. Additionally, to the extent that gentrifiers' hold distinct political attitudes from the long-term residents of gentrifying neighborhoods, their heightened engagement could shift how local governments perceive neighborhood priorities and even if temporally bounded, could give them outsize influence in local politics. Empirically, this paper introduces a novel approach to identifying and classifying distinct types of urban residents. This allows for a highly granular, individual-level analysis of how movement and neighborhood context influence local voting behavior over time.

In addition to elucidating the micro-level politics of gentrification, this paper also contributes to the literature on political participation by further contextualizing resourced-based theories of participation. Understanding individual political participation as a function of not just personal material wealth but also of surrounding context, provides new insight into how the interaction of privilege and place shapes political participation. This understand-

ing is particularly salient as housing costs continue to rise and better-resourced individuals increasingly turn to previously disadvantaged places for greater housing choice. Ultimately, findings from this paper suggest that gentrifiers are a politically significant group in local politics and that studying their behavior allows political scientists to refine existing theories of urban inequality through the lens of place-based identity and privilege, which in turn has larger implications for our understanding of participation and representation.

Gentrification & Political Participation

Gentrifier Characteristics & Behavior

Prior literature on the relationship between gentrification and individual-level behavior focuses largely on the consequences of physical and cultural displacement for the participation of long-term residents in gentrifying areas. Some ethnographies find pockets of community resistance (Robinson 1995), but most find gentrification to be demobilizing for long-term residents, particularly lower-income, Black residents (Newman and Pearson-Merkowitz 2016; Knotts and Haspel 2006; Michener 2013). This work is paramount to understanding how communities respond to the negative externalities wrought by gentrification, yet it also treats gentrification as a largely immutable force that produces only flight or resistance among long-term residents. In doing so, it overlooks the possibility that living in a gentrifying neighborhood shapes political behavior not only for existing residents, but also for newer in-movers, who may be mobilized not in opposition to gentrification, but in ways that sustain and advance the process.

Gentrifiers typically have higher incomes, college degrees, and professional jobs compared to long-term residents of gentrifying neighborhoods (Blasius and Friedrichs 2019; Clay 2017; Florida 2002; Ley 1997; Hwang and Lin 2016). Rising housing costs (Desmond 2022; Feiveson and Schreiner 2024; DeSilver 2024) often draw these often younger residents to gentrifying areas offering both urban amenities and relative affordability (Guerrieri, Hartley, and Hurst

2013; Couture et al. 2024; Blasius and Friedrichs 2019). This combination of affordability and urbanity is rooted in decades of disinvestment in Black communities through redlining, racial covenants, and other practices that devalued urban housing while channeling investment to white suburbs (Rucks-Ahidiana 2021; Rothstein 2017; Hyra 2008; Dantzler 2021; Howell and Korver-Glenn 2021). As a result, gentrifiers occupy privileged positions in historically disadvantaged, often Black and Latino neighborhoods, and complicate traditional theories of participation.

Gentrification scholars have detailed the consequences of gentrifier privilege and preferences for the neighborhoods they enter (Zukin 2009; Hyra 2017; Freeman 2006). For example, Zukin (2009) shows Williamsburg gentrifiers favoring upscale groceries and coffee shops over bodegas or stores owned by long-term, working-class Puerto Rican or Hasidic Jewish residents while Parekh (2015) finds that finds that in New Orleans, gentrifiers' expectations around the use of public space and racial biases increased demands for policing in predominantly Black areas. For lower-income groups, with fewer resources and limited residential mobility, place-based communities are important sources of support and mobilization (Betancur 2002; Hyra 2008). This rich qualitative evidence demonstrates how gentrifier preferences and power can disrupt these communities to reorganize the neighborhood around gentrifier tastes, yet whether such dynamics extend to political behavior is still underexplored.

Gentrifier Political Participation

The existing literature leaves open the possibility that gentrifier behavior, while potentially disruptive to existing communities, may not extend to the explicitly political realm or may simply be a function of personal economic resources or racial identity. I argue that gentrifiers engage politically, but as a function of not just their personal resources and characteristics but also their presence in previously disinvested spaces.

Gentrifiers presence in gentrifying spaces distinguishes them from individuals of similar socio-economic backgrounds in non-gentrifying areas. Traditionally affluent neighborhoods

have decades of investment in public safety, schools, and infrastructure (Solari 2012; Souza Briggs and Keys 2009; Albrecht and Albrecht 2007; Swanstrom, Dreier, and Mollenkopf 2002). Research demonstrates that residents in these neighborhoods often oppose government intervention, seeing it as a threat to their own autonomy, resources, and power (Trounstine 2020) even going so far as to secede from city jurisdictions (Jones 2024; Mock 2023). These movements are linked first to the longstanding segregation in American society and the attempts of predominantly white suburbs to maintain segregated school districts and social services. They are also linked to a preference for privatization and exclusivity as a means of safeguarding wealth. In contrast, gentrifying neighborhoods typically lack this base of resources, motivating proactive gentrifier political action.

In gentrifying neighborhoods, limited existing resources often shift resident priorities toward building up investment, attention, and improved services rather than safeguarding existing ones. Gentrifiers frequently view these neighborhoods as sites of future promise whether it be through economic development, increased property value, or access to cultural amenities at lower costs (Florida 2002; Brown-Saracino 2009). Thus, service or infrastructure deficits are interpreted as opportunities for improvement. While this does not preclude gentrifiers from pursuing exclusionary outcomes in the future, it nevertheless for a certain time, makes their political participation consistent and proactive aimed at engaging public officials and private actors to reshape the neighborhood.

The racial composition of gentrifying neighborhoods also motivates participation particularly through perceptions of disorder and the need for improvement. Gentrifiers, often white, frequently move into neighborhoods with larger Black and Latino populations. Traditionally the racial threat stemming from the proximity of whites to non-white racial out-groups has been a salient force animating white voters' participation in local politics (Enos 2016; Trounstine 2018; Hamel and Wilcox-Archuleta 2022). Yet prior work finds that gentrifiers often profess a preference for racial diversity and seek out racially diverse neighborhoods (Ellen and O'Regan 2011; Grier and Perry 2018; Brown-Saracino 2009). My theory argues that

despite these expressed preferences, racial stereotypes persist, leading gentrifiers to associate majority non-white neighborhoods with disorder or crime, particularly where visible poverty is present (Quillian and Pager 2001; Parekh 2015). As a result, even in the absence of explicit racial animus, intersecting race and class-based biases motivate political engagement in neighborhoods with larger non-white populations, oriented toward improving perceived deficiencies in public goods and services.

Gentrifier participation is driven not simply by their presence in previously disinvested neighborhoods, but by their race and class-based advantages relative to long-term residents. While moving into a gentrifying neighborhood is rarely an explicitly political act, it carries political consequences. Residents broadly share goals such as safety, effective public services, and economic opportunity, but differ sharply in their resources and experiences with government responsiveness. Because responsiveness is closely tied to political efficacy (**schumacher2020politicians; Singh & Dunn 2015**), gentrifiers' socio-economic privilege affords both greater capacity and greater confidence that government will respond to their demands. In contrast, long-term residents of disinvested neighborhoods have endured decades of neglect, from slow public safety responses (Seim et al. 2018) and underfunded schools (Nuamah and Ogorzalek 2021; Institute 2022) to inadequate drinking water (Mohai 2018), crumbling infrastructure (Nicoletti, Sirenko, and Verma 2023; Hirsch et al. 2017), and government inaction during crises (Bullard 2008). This persistent neglect erodes trust and suppresses participation, creating disparities in political participation between gentrifiers and long-term residents.

Gentrifiers' heightened political participation is likely to be most consequential in local politics, where issues such as neighborhood conditions and public safety are most engaged. The specific elements central to gentrification: public infrastructure, city services, housing development decisions, and many more, are all highly localized issues. While concurrent federal, state, and local elections may allow gentrifier participation to influence broader electoral outcomes, the most visible and meaningful effects are expected at the local level,

where their preferences and demands are most immediately expressed. Even as local politics become increasingly nationalized, gentrification remains a valuable context for examining how neighborhood-level conditions shape political attitudes and participation.

In sum, the historic disinvestment in gentrifying neighborhoods, coupled with the absence of strong community organizations or interest groups, makes gentrifier political participation essential to elevating their neighborhood's economic standing relative to even residents of traditionally affluent neighborhoods. Furthermore, gentrifiers' race-class privilege provides both resource advantages and a greater sense of political efficacy compared to long-term residents. Ultimately, gentrifiers' heightened political engagement stems from the intersection of personal status and a broader landscape of disinvestment and weak public infrastructure.

Theoretical Expectations

Gentrifiers, often better resourced and more privileged than the areas that they move into, are motivated to participate politically in order to garner increased attention and resources to their neighborhoods. Thus:

> ***H1****: Movement into a gentrifying tract will increase gentrifiers' likelihood of local turnout relative to movers who move into non-gentrifying tracts.*

The juxtaposition between gentrifiers' personal resources and the under-resourced neighborhoods they enter heightens their political participation relative to other urban residents. Compared to residents of affluent areas, gentrifiers perceive greater local disadvantage and cannot rely on existing infrastructure to motivate change, while their socio-economic and racial status affords greater capacity to participate than long-term residents. Thus:

> ***H2****: Gentrifiers post-move will have a higher likelihood of local turnout relative to residents of more traditionally affluent tracts and to long-term residents of gentrifying tracts.*

Prior research on urban gentrification often emphasizes how racial dynamics of gentrifying neighborhoods structure the behavior of gentrifiers outside of the explicitly political realm. Gentrifiers often lodge complaints about the neighborhood (Ocejo 2024; Verrilli 2025; WNYC 2014), feel endangered (Parekh 2015; Hyra 2008), and resist integrating with existing communities and other residents (Freeman 2006; Grier and Perry 2018) when living among more non-white residents. Additionally, following the literature on proximity to majority Black neighborhoods and perceived racial threat among whites, I expect that

> ***H3****: Gentrifiers will be more likely to turnout locally when moving into more heavily Black and Latino tracts.*

Case Selection

I test my hypotheses in the contexts of Austin, TX and Durham, NC. Both are rapidly gentrifying contexts, with development fueled in part by growing science and technology industries and proximity to major research institutions. Both have seen dramatic increases in the number of new residents moving to the area over the past decade, particularly white residents moving into the areas closes to downtown (Fisher 2025; Vaughan and Eanes 2018). However, they differ in key ways that allow me to test gentrifier political behavior in distinct gentrifying contexts. Durham is a smaller, more compact city with strong Black cultural heritage stemming from its strong middle-class Black population and participation in the Civil Rights Movement (Brown 2009; McKinney Jr 2024; Oglesby 2020). A strong black middle class and a history of political activism influence my analysis in two distinct ways. First, a more robust middle class may increase the number of Black voters in my sample categorized as gentrifiers (I use a socio-economic-based measure), as increased capital among Black Durham residents may push them to enter gentrifying neighborhoods at greater rates than in Austin. Second, a history of strong political activism could lead to greater organizing and resistance to displacement among long-term, especially Black residents, within Durham's

gentrifying neighborhoods, which may narrow the engagement gap between gentrifiers and long-term residents relative to Austin.

Austin is a larger, more sprawling city than Durham, with a greater Latino population and at a more advanced stage of gentrification. Many Black residents in Austin have already been displaced, reducing their numbers and political influence compared to Durham. While Latino communities in East Austin have histories of activism, their engagement has been more non-electoral, and mixed immigration status further complicates traditional turnout. In North Austin, gentrifying areas tend to have more long-term white residents, making gentrification there more class-based. As a result, political participation among long-term residents of color in Austin may be lower than in Durham, and in some areas, racial demographic shifts may be less pronounced.

Including both cities allows me to assess how broadly my findings apply across distinct racial, geographic, and historical gentrification contexts. For example, do gentrifiers show greater political engagement in cities where gentrification is more concentrated and downtown-centered? What about in places where more gentrifiers are Black? These cases help refine my theory to capture contextual nuances. Still, I anticipate my theory of heightened gentrifier participation will hold in both cities, as the main drivers of participation, gentrifiers' resource advantages and their desire to influence neighborhood change, are consistent across contexts.

The core of my theory suggests that we should see similar trends across other city contexts outside of Austin and Durham, yet for this study, I focus on these two cities. I do not investigate longer-established cases such as New York or San Francisco, as gentrification began decades earlier and thus more recent trends tend to reflect patterns of super-gentrification rather than initial development. Additionally, unlike other recently gentrifying cities such as Denver, Washington, D.C., and Philadelphia, both Durham and Austin offer access to local community survey data that include geolocation information for respondents and match the years of the available voter file data. This survey data allows me to evaluate some of

the theoretical mechanisms behind gentrifier political participation. While future research can and should expand to additional cities undergoing similar transformations, Durham and Austin provide uniquely advantageous foundations for this initial study due to their recent gentrification timelines and the availability of highly granular political and demographic data.

Measuring Gentrification

Research Design

In order to assess the relationship between gentrification and local political participation, I use L2 voter file data from Travis County, TX from 2014-2022 and publicly available voter file data from the state of North Carolina from 2015-2022. Both are comprised of annual snapshots allowing me to locate voters at their addresses each year and identify movement through address changes. Previous quantitative work on gentrification has largely captured gentrifiers at the neighborhood level, identifying the growth in white, college-educated residents to an area or the construction of more expensive housing units. Nelsen, Ramanathan, and Ogorzalek (2023) create an individual-level measure with original survey data using self-reported demographic data and length of residence to identify gentrifiers within their sample. However, this measure limits the ability to assess how gentrifying neighborhoods themselves influence behavior, as it cannot distinguish whether a respondent moved from a non-gentrifying area or compare behavior before and after relocation. In contrast, my measure more precisely isolates the influence of living in a gentrifying neighborhood and can causally identify how movement influences voter behavior across different resident types.

To classify the gentrification status of each neighborhood, I calculate changes in American Community Survey Data (ACS) data from 2014(2015) to 2022 to classify census tracts as eligible or ineligible to gentrify in the first year of the range. While there's no consensus on how to measure gentrification, most studies use census data to track socio-economic changes

over time. The debate continues over whether race should be included in these measures (Fallon 2021; Nelsen, Ramanathan, and Ogorzalek 2023; Lee and Velez 2024). Although race is central to gentrification due to historical racial inequity and spatial segregation, I use a measure focused solely on socio-economic changes in order to better isolate and test the role of both individual racial identity and neighborhood racial composition for gentrifier political behavior.

Tracts below the city-wide median income and rent in the first year of the data range are classified as eligible to gentrify. These tracts are then divided into three categories based on changes in the percentage of college-educated residents and median rent.[1] Tracts in the top tercile of eligible tracts for these increases and those with rent increases above the city median, are classified as gentrifying. This follows Laniyonu (2018)'s criteria for gentrification and mirrors others that have used changes in census data to classify gentriyfing tracts (Freeman 2005; Zuk et al. 2018).[2] Tracts that are eligible in the initial year but do not meet the gentrifying threshold by the final year are classified as low SES. Tracts never eligible to gentrify are classified as high SES.[3] The maps below show the gentrification status of each census tract in Austin and Durham in the final year of the data range.

[1] To calculate changes, I use the tidycensus package in R which pulls the 5-year ACS estimates by year (with the specified year being the last year in the range). Since these estimates aggregate data collected over a five-year period, I attribute overall differences between the 5-year estimates to the differences in the final year of the aggregation.

[2]Laniyonu (2018)'s measure classifies only tracts in the top tercile of changes in median rent and percent college educated as gentrified, however I include the second criteria to capture tracts that are in the earlier stages of gentrification.

[3] See Tables 2-3 of the Supplementary Information (pg. 1) for the distribution of tracts by gentrification status by each city.

Gentrification Status by Census Tract in Austin and Durham (2014–2022).



Austin Gentrification Map



Durham Gentrification Map

To locate voters within tracts, I geolocate the addresses from the voter file and spatially join them with census tract shapefiles by year. I then identify movers, individuals who changed addresses between years in the voter file. To account for the fact that moves may not be reflected in the voter file until the election following an address change, I construct a *move_period* variable that includes both the year of the address change and the preceding year. I then classify movers and non-movers into distinct resident types based on the socio-economic status (SES) of their census tracts. For movers, this is based on the SES of the tract that they moved from and the SES status of the tract they moved into, while for non-movers, it is the SES status of the classification for the entirety of the time range. See Tables 6-7 of the Supplementary Information (pg.1) for details about the distribution of movers by city.

Dependent Variable

The key dependent variable is participation in local elections. Within Travis County, TX, there was at least one local election in every year in the sample (2014-2022). Some local elections occur concurrently with federal and state elections. In order to isolate local elections, I count participation for only the local contests that occur as standalone elections, thus turnout rates in Austin are particularly low since they measure participation only in standalone local elections in Austin. In North Carolina, the overwhelming majority of municipal elections occur every other year in off-years from federal elections and thus are standalone by nature. My main measure of participation is a binary measure indicating whether or not a voter participated in any local election that they were eligible for each local election year.[4]

Key Explanatory Variables

The main explanatory variable is gentrifier status. To construct the gentrifier variable, I identify individuals who moved from a high SES tract (those with a median household income above the city average) into a gentrifying tract (see above for qualifications to be categorized as a gentrifying tract).[5] As with measures of gentrification, there are robust debates about whether race should be included as a criterion for defining who counts as a gentrifier (Hwang 2020; Fallon 2021; Kirkland 2008). Again, I use a measure based solely on changes in SES as this allows me to analyze any behavioral differences between white and non-white gentrifiers providing important insight into how the intersection of resource advantage and racial identity shape behavior in gentrifying neighborhoods (see Tables 8-

[4] Some elections are limited to only voters within the city of Austin or Durham, while others are confined to only voters in certain municipalities outside of the city limits. Therefore, I calculate voter eligibility for each voter based on their municipality and then record participation for eligible voters in each election.

[5] To account for out-of-county movers in the North Carolina data, I classify gentrifiers who move from outside of Durham County as gentrifiers if the median household income of the tract they move from is greater than the median household income for the city of Durham in that same year.

9 of the Supplementary Information (pg. 2) for sample breakdown by resident type and race). Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for gentrifiers alongside two other types of residents, affluent-area residents (those living in tracts never eligible to gentrify), and long-term residents (non-movers living in gentrifying tracts).

Table 1: Summary Statistics for Austin and Durham by Resident Type

City	Resident Type	Median Age	% Female	% White	% Black	% Latino	% Asian	N (% Total)
Austin	Gentrifiers	34	52	78	3	15	4	29,055 (6)
	Affluent	53	53	78	2	14	5	170,640 (37)
	Long-term	50	53	66	4	26	3	40,023 (8)
Durham	Gentrifiers	31	49	48	48	2	2	6,927 (3)
	Affluent	49	56	58	38	2	2	75,691 (38)
	Long-term	42	53	32	65	2	0.8	13,511 (7)

Consistent with prior findings, gentrifiers are on average younger than other urban residents and whiter than long-term residents of gentrifying neighborhoods. These statistics also showcase a key difference between the sample of gentrifiers in Austin in Durham. In Austin, gentrifiers are predominantly white, with Latino residents as the next largest group, whereas in Durham, gentrifiers are roughly evenly split between white and Black residents, reflecting the cities' overall racial compositions. These distinct racial compositions of gentrifiers in each city allow me to test how individual racial identity structures gentrifier political participation in distinct urban contexts.

Control Variables

I adjust for several other covariates both at the individual and tract-level that are associated with local voter turnout. At the individual-level, I adjust for gender, age, race, and whether an individual resides in a single-unit or multi-unit property. While not an exact measure, residency in a single-unit property is used as a proxy for homeownership, given the existing evidence that being a homeowner makes individuals more likely to participate in politics,

especially at the local level (Yoder 2020; Fischek 2001; Einstein, Glick, and Palmer 2019; Sahn 2024). Since Yoder (2020) finds that buying a house is associated with increased levels of participation, I also include an indicator, *homebuyer*, for whether an individual moved from a multi-unit property into a single-unit property as proxy for buying a home. Of note, since the Texas voter file does not include information about racial or ethnic background, I employ Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding (BISG) which uses an individual's surname and location to estimate the probability that they are of a given racial category (DeLuca and Curiel 2023; Barreto et al. 2022) to impute the race or ethnicity of each of the voters in the voter file based on the probability of each racial category.[6] Finally, I adjust for year and move_period (if the individual moved at some point during the time range of the data). At the tract-level, I adjust for socio-economic indicators such as median household income, % in poverty, % college-educated, % unemployed, demographic indicators such as population, % Non-white, and the tract-level crime rate.[7] For Durham, I also include a variable for whether an individual moved from within or out-of-county since I have access to full state voter records.

[6]For more details about the BISG method see Supplementary Information Section F (pg. 13).

[7]To create a measure of the tract-level crime rate, I obtained incident-level crime data from the City of Austin Police Department from 2014-2022, geolocated the crimes within census tracts based on their geographic coordinates, and aggregated the number of crimes up to the tract level. I also coded by crime-type to create a measure of the violent crime rate, the property crime rate etc. I am unable to incorporate a measure of crime for Durham as the Durham Police Department changed its recording practices from UCR to the NIBRS system in 2018 and the data is not comparable across reporting systems.

Results & Discussion

Movement into Gentrifying Tracts Increases Gentrifier Likelihood of Turnout

My first analysis tests the impact of moving into a gentrifying tract on voting in a local election for gentrifiers relative to non-gentrifier movers. To do this, I implement a difference-in-differences design using a matched sample of movers. I focus exclusively on movers for two reasons 1) the nature of voting records creates a type of self-selection into the group of movers in that individuals most often update their address records when voting. Thus, "movers" may be individuals with baseline higher levels of turnout. In order to isolate the effect of movement into a gentrifying neighborhood, it is best to compare only movers thus reducing this selection bias. 2) Some literature suggests that there may be a movement effect whereby individuals who move into a new neighborhood may be more likely to increase their participation relative to those who remain in one neighborhood during the same period. By focusing only on movers, I again reduce the likelihood that the results are being driven entirely by a mover effect.

I create my matched sample of movers using exact matching on move period (the year a voter's address changed and the preceding year) and racial group category, and then nearest neighbor matching to pair gentrifiers with non-gentrifiers whose pre-move tracts had similar SES characteristics (median household income, median rent, % college-educated, % Non-white) and who themselves have similar individual-level characteristics (age, gender). I also match on my "homebuyer" variable which captures an individual who moved from a multi-unit property to a single-unit property, a proxy for someone buying a home. This yields a matched data set for each city. For Austin, the matched sample is 826,650 observations (75,150 unique movers over 9 years). For Durham, the matched sample is 111,928 observations (13,991 unique movers over 8 years). See Supplementary Information Section B (pg. 2) for details on matching process, balance tests, and tests to assess plausibility of

parallel trends assumption. As the event study model in Figure 1 demonstrates, for both Austin and Durham, gentrifiers and non-gentrifiers have highly similar local voting patterns pre-movement, but following movement, the estimated local turnout for gentrifiers is higher than it is for non-gentrifiers. More broadly, in Austin local turnout has generally increased over time while for Durham, NC the pattern largely mirrors odd-year electoral timing.



Figure 1: Event Study Model: Local Voting Around Move X-axis are years pre and post move period, with 0 being first year after move. Y-axis is the estimated local voting rate. Estimates are from OLS model with fixed event time indicators interacted with a binary treatment subgroup (gentrifiers and non-gentrifiers). 95% CIs displayed. Associated regression estimates can be found in Table 16 of the Supplementary Information (pg. 5) and Table 17 of the Supplementary Information (pg. 6).

Turning to the more formal estimates of the impact of moving for gentrifiers relative to similarly situated non-gentrifiers, I implement a difference-in-differences design and estimate the following linear regression with individual and yearly fixed-effects and clustered standard errors at the individual and census-tract level:

$$\begin{aligned} VotedLocal_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1\, Gentrifier_i + \beta_2\, MovePeriod_{it} + \beta_3\,(Gentrifier_i \times MovePeriod_{it}) \\ + \gamma X_{it} + \alpha_i + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{it}, \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

Where VotedLocal_{it} is an indicator for whether individual i votes in a local election at time t. Gentrifier_i is an indicator for whether an individual is a gentrifier. MovePeriod_t indi-

cates whether the time is before or after the move period. The interaction term $Gentrifier_i \times MovePeriod_{it}$ estimates the differential change in turnout associated with moving into a gentrifying neighborhood. The vector X_{it} includes time-varying neighborhood characteristics: % unemployed, % non-white, % poverty, % college-educated, population, and tract crime rate. Individual fixed effects, α_i, absorb all time-invariant individual characteristics, including gender, age, race, and homeownership, while year fixed effects, δ_t, account for common shocks to turnout across election cycles. The error term ε_{it} captures unobserved factors affecting individual turnout. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the individual and census-tract levels.



Figure 2: Marginal Effects of Gentrifier Status by Race on Voting in a Local Election X-axis is gentrifier status, whether the mover is a gentrifier or not. Y-axis is the change in the predicted probability for voting in a local election after moving. Distinct colors indicate the race of the genrifier. Estimates from fully-specified regression models with individual and time fixed effects and controls at means. 95% CIs displayed. Associated regression estimates can be found in Table 18 of the Supplementary Information (pg. 7).

Figure 2 plots the change in the probability of voting in a local election after moving for gentrifiers and non-gentrifiers disaggregated by race. In Austin, moving is associated with an overall increase in local voting of about 2.7 percentage points but this is substantially

larger for gentrifiers, and in particular, white gentrifiers. For the full gentrifier sample, moving into a gentrifying neighborhood is associated with an additional 2.6 percentage-points, yielding a total post-move increase of roughly 5.3 percentage points. For white gentrifiers, this increases to 2.9 percentage-points relative to other moves, and a total increase of 5.6 percentage-points post-move. Yet non-white gentrifiers experience no statistically distinguishable increase beyond the general effect of moving. Thus the overall increase for gentrifier participation in Austin, is driven almost entirely by increased participation among white gentrifiers.

Heightened participation among white gentrifiers is even more impactful in Durham. Like in Austin, moving is associated with an overall increase in local voting of about 6.4 percentage points. However, among the full sample of gentrifiers, this no distinguishable difference in the change in likelihood of local voting relative to non-gentrifiers. This difference only emerges when looking among white gentrifiers, who are 4.8 percentage-points more likely to turnout in local elections relative to non-gentrifiers. In contrast, non-white gentrifiers experience about a 3 percentage-point decrease in local voting after moving relative to non-gentrifiers. Given that the sample of gentrifiers is much less white than in Austin, the increases in local voting among white gentrifiers do not drive overall effects but instead, they provide an even starker picture of how gentrification can amplify political engagement primarily among white in-movers while reducing participation among non-white in-movers.

To assess whether these patterns are primarily local, I replicate the main analyses using turnout in federal elections as the outcome (see Section I of the Supplementary Information, (p. 20)). In Austin, results for the full gentrifier sample largely mirror those from local elections: gentrifiers significantly increase federal turnout after moving relative to non-gentrifiers. Unlike in local elections, however, this effect is driven by non-white gentrifiers, while white gentrifiers show no significant change in turnout. In Durham, I find no statistically significant effects, though estimates are directionally similar across racial groups to the local turnout results. Taken together, these findings suggest that the participatory effects of

moving into a gentrifying neighborhood are primarily concentrated in local elections, though they may extend to federal turnout in some contexts. The divergent patterns by race and election type in Austin raise important questions for future research about how race and privilege shape political participation across levels of government.

Taken together, the results provide support for *H1*, that gentrifiers increase their likelihood of voting after moving relative to non-gentrifiers, but largely conditional on the individual race of the gentrifier, with white gentrifiers driving increased turnout. More broadly, these findings emphasize the unique effect of relatively privileged residents moving into gentrifying areas on political participation. Through the use of a difference-in-differences design with a matched sample of voters and individual and time fixed effects, the effects reflect within-person changes over time among individuals who moved from similar origin neighborhoods in the same years, isolating the role of the specific movement into a gentrifying for local participation.

Gentrifiers are more likely to Turnout Locally Relative to Long-Term and Affluent-Area Residents

Having established that gentrifiers increase their likelihood of turnout after moving into a gentrifying neighborhood, I next test whether this participation is greater relative to the participation of long-term residents in gentrifying neighborhoods and non-mover residents in more affluent neighborhoods. This test evaluates whether elevated levels of turnout among gentrifiers are only function of living in a gentrifying context or whether their unique positionality contributes to high engagement, and second, to contextualize post-move gentrifier turnout compared to the participation of residents of traditionally affluent areas, those who traditionally turnout in local elections. For these comparisons, I create two distinct matched datasets. In the first, I match gentrifiers to long-term residents based on the aggregate-level characteristics (median household income, % college-educated, % poverty, median rent, and % non-white) of their gentrifying census tracts. This attempts to better account for

neighborhood-level dynamics in order to test how the individual characteristics and positionality of gentrifiers influence engagement. In the second, I match genrifiers to affluent-area residents based on based on individual-level characteristics (age, race, gender, homebuyer status), to test how similarly privileged individuals engage politically in distinct contexts. To account for time, I also match individuals based on a pseudo move-year variable which allows me to compare the behavior of the long-term residents and affluent-area non-movers over the same time period to that of post-move gentrifiers.

The matched sample with long-term residents contains 280,836 observations (62,570 unique voters) in Austin and 51,604 observations (14,044 unique voters) in Durham, both evenly split between gentrifiers and long-term residents. The matched sample with affluent-area residents contains 283,194 observations (61,193 unique voters) in Austin and 52,000 observations (11,647 unique voters) in Durham, again both evenly divided between the two types of residents. I estimate a linear regression with yearly fixed-effects and clustered standard errors at the individual and census-tract level. However, although it also uses a matched sample, this approach does not provide the same causal leverage as the previous analysis. Given how I measure moving, those that update their addresses are by nature more engaged voters as their updating typically occurs when voting. Although this comparison is less causally identified, contrasting gentrifiers with non-moving residents of both gentrifying and affluent neighborhoods is nevertheless important to help contextualize prior move-based estimates within broader patterns of political participation.

Figure 3: Predicted Probability of Voting in a Local Election by Resident Type Top plot displays results from model comparing gentrifiers and long-term residents of gentrifying areas. Bottom plot displays the results from model comparing gentrifiers to affluent-area residents. X-axis is each resident type. Y-axis is the predicted probability of voting in a local election. Estimates from fully-specified linear regression models with controls at means. 95% CIs displayed. Associated regression estimates can be found in Table 19 of the Supplementary Information (pg. 8).

Figure 3 demonstrates that post-move gentrifiers have a greater likelihood of local turnout relative to long-term residents of gentrifying neighborhoods and non-movers in more traditionally affluent areas. In the case of Austin, gentrifiers have a predicted probability of turnout of about 20%, 6% greater than long-term residents of gentrifying areas and 7% greater than non-movers in more traditionally affluent areas. In the case of Durham, gentrifiers also have about a 20% predicted likelihood of local turnout, 5% greater than for long-term residents of gentrifying areas and 4% greater than for affluent-area residents.

The results from the comparison between gentrifiers and affluent-area residents, suggest that there is something unique about the political behavior of gentrifiers outside of their own personal resources that is associated with greater participation relative to similarly resourced voters. This unique factor is their presence in gentrifying contexts. However, when combined with the results from the comparison to long-term residents, it becomes clear that local turnout is not simply correlated with living in a gentrifying spaces, but is also related

to gentrifiers personal characteristics and how they relate to existing residents in gentrifying spaces. Thus, both of these comparisons provide evidence that gentrifiers' unique combination of personal privilege and place is associated with increased local political participation relative to similarly situated groups on the dimensions of resources and geographic location.

Similar to the results from Figure 2, there is significant racial subgroup differences when comparing participation by gentrifiers and other types of urban residents. Although greater gentrifier participation is statistically significant for the full sample, these differences become substantially larger, particularly in Durham, when focusing on white gentrifiers relative to other urban residents (see Figure 11 of the Supplementary Information (pg. 21)). Moreover in both cities, there is no significant difference in the likelihood of local turnout for non-white gentrifiers compared to both long-term residents and affluent-area residents ((see Figure 12 of the Supplementary Information (pg. 21)), suggesting once again, that the results appear to be largely driven by elevated participation among white gentrifiers.

Higher Turnout Among Gentrifiers in more Non-white Neighborhoods

As the previous results demonstrate, racial dynamics are central to the politics of gentrification. To better understand which racial dynamics shape gentrifier participation, I now move beyond just individual-level differences to examine how gentrifiers' racial identities interact with the racial composition of the neighborhoods they enter. While prior findings indicate that heightened participation is largely driven by white gentrifiers, this third analysis focuses on neighborhood context to assess whether political engagement among gentrifiers varies systematically with exposure to more racially non-white environments. In doing so, it brings large-scale quantitative evidence to bear on a substantial body of predominantly qualitative research from scholars of gentrification which finds that white gentrifiers often respond to proximity to non-white residents with an increased sense of danger or disorder and greater demands of city governments and public services.

To directly assess these dynamics, I subset my sample to post-move gentrifiers and then regress the racial composition of the gentrifying tract they moved into, in particular the percentage of Black and Latino residents, on their likelihood of local turnout. I select these two groups specifically because of there strong historical presence in gentrifying neighborhoods and the lack of a long-term Asian population in both Austin and Durham's gentrifying neighborhoods. Furthermore, the racialization and stereotypes of Black and Latino, especially men, as dangerous or threatening are more prevalent and entrenched than they are for Asian Americans.[8]



Figure 4: Gentrifier Predicted Local Turnout by % Black and Latino of Post-Move Tract Y-axis is the predicted probability of voting in a local election after moving. X-axis is the % Black and Latino in the tract gentrifiers enter. Estimates from fully-specified linear regression models with controls at means. 95% CIs displayed. Associated regression estimates can be found in Table 20 of the Supplementary Information (pg. 9).

The results in Figure 4 show that among gentrifiers, movement into areas with greater Black and Latino populations is associated with an increased probability of local turnout. Among gentrifiers in Austin, moving into a tract at the 25th percentile of Black–Latino composition for gentrifying tracts (approximately 21% Black and Latino) is associated with

[8] I conduct additional analyses with different racial demographic compositions (see Figures 7-9 of the Supplementary Information (pg. 16)). Importantly, I find no significant relationship between % Non-white and predicted turnout. In Austin, the results are largely drive by % Black and in Durham, % Black and % Latino are both influential.

a predicted probability of local turnout of 5%. This increases to around 11% at the sample median (36% Black–Latino) and to 20% in tracts at the 75th percentile (57% Black–Latino). Substantively, this corresponds to an increase of approximately 15 percentage-points in local voting as gentrifiers move from relatively whiter to less white gentrifying neighborhoods.

For gentrifiers in Durham, moving into a tract at the 25th percentile of Black–Latino composition for gentrifying tracts (approximately 38% Black and Latino) is associated with a predicted probability of local turnout of 16%. This increases to 23% at the sample median (55% Black–Latino) and to 33% in tracts at the 75th percentile (77% Black–Latino). Again substantively, Durham gentrifiers have an increase of approximately 17 percentage points in their likelihood of local turnout when they move into more racially diverse gentrifying neighborhoods.

Interestingly, in Austin, the results hold even when looking only among non-white gentrifiers. However, in Durham, consistent with prior findings, the results are strongest when looking at only white gentrifiers and do not appear significant among non-white gentrifiers. See Figures 13-14 of the Supplementary Information (pg. 24) for Figure 4 results by race of gentrifier.

Overall, these results provide support for *H3* and indicate that the relative racial composition of gentrifying neighborhoods has implications for gentrifier turnout. Previous work in local politics has demonstrated that racial threat among white voters can activate increased voter turnout, but this racial threat has typically been linked to the growing presence of an out-group, in this case non-white residents. With gentrification, this pattern is reversed, with often white residents moving into areas that were once predominantly non-white. Even as these areas grow whiter during gentrification (Rucks-Ahidiana 2021; Fisher 2025; Bahrampour, Lang, and Mellnik 2025), there is a period of time where white residents are often in spaces with larger non-white populations. As these results demonstrate, when this type of context is present, we see heightened turnout by these newer, privileged residents. Furthermore, past research has demonstrated that white respondents associate predominantly Black

neighborhoods with greater levels of crime and disorder absent objective measures (Quillian and Pager 2001; Sampson and Raudenbush 2004). Thus, these results could be a function of white gentrifier perceptions of increased disorder in the presence of more non-white residents in their neighborhoods motivating increased political participation to remedy said disorder.

The distinct findings with regard to non-white gentrifiers in Austin and Durham could point to differences in political behavior between Latino gentrifiers who comprise most of the non-white gentrifier sample in Austin and Black gentrifiers, who comprise the majority of the non-white sample in Durham. Prior work demonstrates how pervasive anti-black attitudes in American society can influence political behavior even among non-white racial groups (Eric Oliver and Wong 2003; Corral 2020; Pérez, Robertson, and Vicuña 2023). Thus, Austin could be an example where Latino gentrifiers exhibit similar levels of political activation as white gentrifiers when moving into areas with greater numbers of Black residents. Whereas in Durham, where many non-white gentrifiers are Black, these same patterns do not present themselves. Further inquiry into the behavior of non-white gentrifiers in distinct racial contexts is necessary to understand how gentrification as a racial process influences micro-level political behaviors.

In order to assess how other neighborhood-level characteristics may shape gentrifier engagement, I also examine the relative influence of % poverty, % unemployed, and tract-level crime rate on gentrifier likelihood of local turnout (See Section H of the Supplementary Information (pg. 14)). The results are less consistent when examining these variables. For instance, in Austin, gentrifiers are more likely to turnout when moving into tracts where greater proportions of the population live in poverty, but not in the case of Durham. For % unemployed, there is no significant relationship with gentrifier turnout in either city. And finally, for Austin (where crime data is available), there is no significant relationship between the crime rate and gentrifier turnout. While it is nearly impossible to cleanly separate race and class dynamics within neighborhoods, these results suggest that among gentrifiers, socio-economic indicators do not appear to be as powerful in driving turnout as neighborhood

racial demographics.

Mechanisms

Taken together, these results suggest a strong relationship between gentrifiers and increased political participation but cannot explain what drives this type of behavior. My theory argues that gentrifiers' positionality, well-resourced but living in previously disinvested spaces, motivates their political participation. Dissatisfied with the infrastructure, appearance, and services in their gentrifying neighborhoods, they use politics to garner increased government attention and investment. But relying on solely administrative data does not allow me to assess gentrifier perceptions of their neighborhood, a key component to my theory. To more directly explore the attitudinal component of this theory, I leverage community surveys from Austin and Durham that capture respondent attitudes towards their neighborhoods and their level of interaction with local government.

Gentrifiers Pair Negative Neighborhood Perceptions with Demands of Local Government

The survey data comes from the Austin Community Survey and the Durham Resident Survey. Both were fielded annually (for Austin 2014-2019; for Durham 2015-2022) and contain similar questions. Each respondent also has geolocation information which allows me to locate them within census tracts. Using respondents' tract location and ACS data, I identify respondents in gentrifying tracts and who report greater annual household income relative to the tract average. As the surveys do not contain questions on length of residency in a neighborhood, I use these two criteria to create my gentrifier measure that best mirrors those used in my previous analyses. For outcome variables, I first use a composite measure that combines respondent evaluations of various conditions of their neighborhood, (cleanliness, street and sidewalk conditions, and safety while walking at night). Next I create a binary variable that

measures whether or not they reported contacting the local city government in the last year.[9]

To test the perceived neighborhood conditions outcome, I run linear regression models with robust standard errors, with resident type as the key explanatory variable. I include additional individual-level covariates: age, gender, renter, and race, as well as tract-level covariates: population, % college-educated, % Non-white, and % unemployed, and median household income. I also control for survey year.

Results



Figure 5: Gentrifier Perceptions of Neighborhood Conditions Y-axis are the coefficient estimates for gentrifiers (white gentrifiers in Durham). X axis are the cities. Neighborhood conditions outcome is left plot contact local government is right. 95% CIs displayed. Associated regression estimates for Austin can be found in Tables 21-22 of the Supplementary Information (pg. 10)) and for Durham, Tables 23-24 of the Supplementary Information (pg. 11))

.

The results in Figure 5 provide evidence for potential mechanisms behind increased gentrifier political participation. First, they demonstrate that gentrifiers are more likely to hold negative evaluations of the conditions in their neighborhoods relative to all other types of residents and that this holds in both cities. This provides preliminary evidence that the combination of personal resources and context structure gentrifiers' more negative perceptions

[9] For more details on survey sample and construction of key variables see Section G of the Supplementary Information (pg. 13).

of their neighborhoods. However in Durham, this is the case only among white gentrifiers, once again mirroring the results from the analyses using administrative data and suggesting that whiteness also structures gentrifier attitudes towards their neighborhoods (See Table 21 of the Supplementary Information (pg. 10)) and Table 23 of the Supplementary Information (pg. 11)) to compare results among full sample and among just White gentrifiers). Combined with the results from my main analyses using administrative data, this suggests that gentrifier political engagement may a be a product of their desire to improve the quality of the conditions in their neighborhood.

Next, the results demonstrate that gentrifiers are more likely to contact city government relative to other residents. This finding holds for the full sample of Gentrifiers in Durham, although the magnitude of the coefficient for the relationship is stronger when restricted to just white gentrifiers. Together, this provides further support for the earlier findings gleaned from the administrative voting data by signaling gentrifiers' propensity to make demands of local government and public agencies. In particular, this suggests that gentrifiers are not only less satisfied with the conditions of their neighborhoods but also that they are more willing to contact the local government about it. More broadly, it highlights the distinct attitudes and behaviors that combine to make gentrifiers an important group within the landscape of local politics.

Conclusion

Gentrification has reshaped many central-city neighborhoods, bringing gentrifiers, often white and affluent, into previously disinvested communities of color and disrupting existing community networks. Yet political science has paid limited attention to the individual-level political dynamics of gentrification, particularly the behavior of gentrifiers themselves. Drawing on ethnographic accounts and the political participation literature, I argue that gentrifiers engage at elevated levels in local politics, driven by the combination of their personal

resources and their proximity to marginalized urban spaces, which they seek to reshape to reflect their cultural and economic preferences. This positioning distinguishes them both from affluent-area residents, due to their exposure to disadvantage, and from long-term residents, whose political behavior is shaped by fewer resources and weaker access to local officials. While existing research emphasizes the role of socio-economic status and community ties in participation, it has not directly addressed how personally well-resourced residents, often distinct from their neighbors and with limited community ties, behave politically, in part due to the empirical challenges of studying gentrification at the individual level.

In order to test my argument, I draw on over one million unique voter records across seven years in the rapidly gentrifying contexts of Austin, TX and Durham, NC. I combine these records with *ACS* data in order to categorize different kinds of urban residents based on the socio-economic status of the tracts they reside in and move between. I use these categories to test a series of hypotheses about the local political participation of gentrifiers first finding that gentrifiers increase their participation in local elections when moving into gentrifying neighborhoods relative to highly similar movers who do not enter gentrifying areas, and that this increase is largely driven by white gentrifiers. Next, I find evidence that gentrifiers are more likely to turnout in local elections relative to affluent-area residents and long-term residents of gentrifying tracts. I then assess the role that neighborhood racial demographics play in gentrifier political participation. Here I find evidence that gentrifiers have even greater participation when moving into tracts with greater populations of Black and Latino residents relative to gentrifiers who move into whiter tracts.

This paper contributes to the literature on gentrification by demonstrating how gentrification mobilizes gentrifiers. Previous work has focused on the relationship between gentrification and the political participation of long-term residents, but has yet to investigate its influence on newer in-movers. By focusing on the relationship between gentrification and gentrifier political participation, this study demonstrates how gentrifiers exert influence in their new neighborhoods, and suggests how gentrifiers' political behavior may act as an

accelerant to neighborhood transformation.

Furthermore, this study contributes to work in racial and ethnic politics by examining the ways in which racial bias and racial threat can animate local political behavior outside of the reactive politics of predominantly white, affluent neighborhoods. Even among often politically liberal, younger urbanites, racial biases that link predominantly non-white neighborhoods with perceived disorder, can increase political participation for white gentrifiers. These dynamics suggest that racial bias operates not only through explicit hostility, but also through subtle perceptions of neighborhood decline and safety, which can spur political action.

Additionally, the findings highlight important racial differences in political behavior among gentrifiers themselves: white and non-white gentrifiers do not appear to engage politically in the same ways. This underscores that even among well-resourced individuals, race continues to shape patterns of participation in meaningful ways. More broadly, the paper offers a theoretical contribution to the study of local political participation by articulating a framework for understanding how relatively privileged individuals behave politically when embedded in historically marginalized spaces. Specifically, it argues that the juxtaposition of personal advantage with neighborhood disadvantage creates a powerful incentive structure: privileged individuals in less privileged environments will turn to politics to remedy perceived disadvantage.

My research is not without limitations. First, while my findings demonstrate that gentrification is associated with greater participation among gentrifiers, they do not reveal the specific nature of said participation. That is, we still know little about the content of gentrifiers' politics. To fully understand the consequences of this increased political participation for urban policy and governance requires research on the political attitudes and preferences of gentrifiers and how this contributes to local political outcomes. Another limitation of this paper is the ecological inference used to create my categories of urban residents, that is, the categories are based on the assumption that individuals living in higher resourced areas are

themselves personally well-resourced. Future research should leverage both highly granular administrative data and individual-level survey data that can shed light on the personal characteristics of gentrifiers as well as provide greater insight into the mechanisms driving their participation. Ultimately, the politics of gentrification presents a promising avenue for political scientists. It offers insight into how power is wielded in the modern American city—not only through wealth, but through the ability to re-frame public needs, influence institutions, and reshape urban space.

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Supplementary Information

for **Moving in and Mobilizing: Gentrifiers and Local Political Participation**

Contents

A Sample Descriptives & Distribution

A.1 Voter File Representativeness

Table 2: Demographics for Registered Voters and Travis County (Austin) Pop. > 18

Data	18-29	30-44	45-64	65+	Female	White	Black	Latino	Asian
ACS	29%	31%	29%	13%	50%	76%	9%	24%	6%
Voter File	17%	35%	32%	17%	49%	73%	3%	19%	5%

Table 3: Demographics for Registered Voters and Durham County (Durham) Pop. > 18

Data	18-29	30-44	45-64	65+	Female	White	Black	Latino	Asian
ACS	25%	29%	30%	16%	52%	42%	36%	14%	5%
Voter File	32%	28%	29%	12%	50%	46%	34%	3%	3%

A.2 Census Tracts by Gentrification Status

Table 4: Austin Census Tracts by Gentrification Status

Tract Status	Total Tracts	Percent
Gentrifying	53	22.26%
High SES	147	61.76%
Low SES	38	15.97%
Total	238	100.00%

Table 5: Durham Census Tracts by Gentrification Status

Tract Status	Total Tracts	Percent
Gentrifying	18	25.71%
High SES	43	61.43%
Low SES	9	12.86%
Total	70	100.00%

A.3 Movers by Year

Table 6: Austin Within-County Movers by Year (2015–2022)

Year	Total Movers	Percent
2015	24201	12.48%
2016	16702	8.61%
2017	34651	17.87%
2018	27849	14.36%
2019	29317	15.12%
2020	16334	8.42%
2021	33661	17.36%
2022	11168	5.76%
Total	193883	100.00%

Table 7: Durham Within-State Movers by Year (2016–2022)

Year	Total Movers	Percent
2016	6338	7.68%
2017	21819	26.45%
2018	6061	7.35%
2019	14335	17.38%
2020	9254	11.22%
2021	22219	26.94%
2022	2458	2.98%
Total	82484	100.00%

A.4 Resident Type by Race

Table 8: AUS: Resident Type by Race

Resident Type	White	Black	Latino	Asian	Total
Gentrifiers	22545 (77.6%)	731 (2.5%)	4458 (15.3%)	1302 (4.5%)	29055
Long-term Residents	26649 (66.3%)	1510 (3.8%)	10761 (26.8%)	1235 (3.1%)	40192
Affluent-area Residents	152250 (76.4%)	4759 (2.4%)	31019 (15.6%)	11094 (5.6%)	199272
Other Movers	124070 (75.3%)	4532 (2.8%)	28831 (17.5%)	7285 (4.4%)	164828

Table 9: DUR: Resident Type by Race

Resident Type	White	Black	Latino	Asian	Total
Gentrifiers	2703 (47.8%)	2707 (47.9%)	146 (2.6%)	97 (1.7%)	5653
Long-term Residents	3926 (32.0%)	7975 (65.1%)	252 (2.1%)	103 (0.8%)	12256
Affluent-area Residents	41850 (58.4%)	27136 (37.9%)	1131 (1.6%)	1502 (2.1%)	71619
Other Movers	31838 (52.8%)	24876 (41.2%)	1671 (2.8%)	1967 (3.3%)	60352

B Matching

Matching procedure. We use 1:1 nearest-neighbor matching without replacement, with distance defined by a propensity score estimated via logistic regression.

Table 10: Matched and Full Samples

	Observations	Unique Voters
Austin (Full)	2,132,713	193,883
Austin (Matched)	826,650	75,150
Durham (Full)	659,872	82,484
Durham (Matched)	111,928	13,991

After I have my matched data on pre-merge tract and individual characteristics, I identify the voters in the matched data from the full data set in order to incorporate the post-move data. Thus the long format matched dataset is 826,650 voter-year observations for Austin and 111,928 voter-year observations for Durham.

Table 11: Covariate Balance Before and After Matching

	Means Treated	Means Control	Std. Mean Diff.	Var. Ratio	eCDF Mean	eCDF Max	Std. Pair Dist.
distance	0.16	0.13	0.52	1.15	0.14	0.23	
mhhi	74022.60	72113.12	0.05	1.15	0.05	0.11	
mrent	1342.58	1260.39	0.26	0.93	0.07	0.15	
pcol	0.58	0.53	0.29	0.78	0.07	0.12	
p_race_nonwhite	0.37	0.43	-0.32	0.72	0.07	0.14	
age	39.02	43.85	-0.37	0.81	0.05	0.17	
homebuyer	0.28	0.22	0.13		0.06	0.06	
move_year2016	0.06	0.05	0.04		0.01	0.01	
move_year2015	0.06	0.04	0.10		0.02	0.02	
move_year2017	0.21	0.15	0.14		0.06	0.06	
move_year2018	0.11	0.14	-0.12		0.04	0.04	
move_year2019	0.18	0.16	0.06		0.02	0.02	
move_year2020	0.07	0.10	-0.09		0.02	0.02	
move_year2021	0.23	0.25	-0.04		0.02	0.02	
move_year2022	0.08	0.11	-0.13		0.03	0.03	
race_catA	0.04	0.04	0.01		0.00	0.00	
race_catB	0.03	0.03	-0.01		0.00	0.00	
race_catH	0.15	0.18	-0.07		0.02	0.02	
race_catO	0.00	0.00	-0.01		0.00	0.00	
race_catW	0.77	0.75	0.06		0.02	0.02	

Austin — Full Sample

	Means Treated	Means Control	Std. Mean Diff.	Var. Ratio	eCDF Mean	eCDF Max	Std. Pair Dist.
distance	0.16	0.16	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
mhhi	74022.60	73102.80	0.02	1.00	0.02	0.05	0.41
mrent	1342.58	1328.12	0.05	0.87	0.02	0.05	0.42
pcol	0.58	0.58	0.01	0.97	0.00	0.01	0.43
p_race_nonwhite	0.37	0.37	0.01	0.96	0.01	0.02	0.42
age	39.02	38.85	0.01	1.11	0.01	0.02	0.36
homebuyer	0.28	0.28	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.38
move_year2016	0.06	0.06	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
move_year2015	0.06	0.06	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
move_year2017	0.21	0.21	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
move_year2018	0.11	0.11	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
move_year2019	0.18	0.18	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
move_year2020	0.07	0.07	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
move_year2021	0.23	0.23	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
move_year2022	0.08	0.08	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
race_catA	0.04	0.04	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
race_catB	0.03	0.03	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
race_catH	0.15	0.15	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
race_catO	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
race_catW	0.77	0.77	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00

Austin — Matched Sample

	Means Treated	Means Control	Std. Mean Diff.	Var. Ratio	eCDF Mean	eCDF Max	Std. Pair Dist.
distance	0.09	0.08	0.30	1.04	0.09	0.16	
mhhi	64171.57	58098.46	0.25	0.94	0.08	0.14	
mrent	1086.23	1018.07	0.30	0.88	0.05	0.16	
pcol	0.49	0.46	0.16	1.15	0.04	0.10	
p_race_nonwhite	0.51	0.54	-0.10	1.27	0.05	0.11	
age	37.76	40.07	-0.15	0.96	0.03	0.09	
homebuyer	0.18	0.18	-0.02		0.01	0.01	
move_year2016	0.06	0.04	0.08		0.02	0.02	
move_year2017	0.26	0.20	0.12		0.05	0.05	
move_year2018	0.07	0.07	0.01		0.00	0.00	
move_year2019	0.18	0.19	-0.04		0.01	0.01	
move_year2020	0.10	0.12	-0.06		0.02	0.02	
move_year2021	0.28	0.29	-0.04		0.02	0.02	
move_year2022	0.06	0.08	-0.11		0.03	0.03	
race_catasian	0.01	0.02	-0.07		0.01	0.01	
race_catblack	0.55	0.47	0.16		0.08	0.08	
race_catlatino	0.02	0.03	-0.01		0.00	0.00	
race_catwhite	0.41	0.48	-0.14		0.07	0.07	

Durham — Full Sample

	Means Treated	Means Control	Std. Mean Diff.	Var. Ratio	eCDF Mean	eCDF Max	Std. Pair Dist.
distance	0.09	0.09	0.00	1.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
mhhi	64171.57	62572.77	0.06	0.95	0.03	0.05	0.45
mrent	1086.23	1072.69	0.06	0.94	0.01	0.04	0.36
pcol	0.49	0.48	0.06	1.09	0.02	0.05	0.47
p_race_nonwhite	0.51	0.54	-0.09	1.17	0.04	0.08	0.48
age	37.76	36.78	0.06	1.19	0.01	0.04	0.50
homebuyer	0.18	0.17	0.01		0.00	0.00	0.46
move_year2016	0.06	0.06	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
move_year2017	0.26	0.26	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
move_year2018	0.07	0.07	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
move_year2019	0.18	0.18	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
move_year2020	0.10	0.10	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
move_year2021	0.28	0.28	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
move_year2022	0.06	0.06	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
race_catasian	0.01	0.01	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
race_catblack	0.55	0.55	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
race_catlatino	0.02	0.02	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
race_catwhite	0.41	0.41	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00

Durham — Matched Sample

C Parallel Trends



AUS Pre-Move Local Voting Rates

DUR Pre-Move Local Voting Rates

Table 12: AUS: Joint Significance Test of Pre-Treatment Interactions

Res.Df	RSS	Df	Sum of Sq	F	Pr(F)
146706.00	13983.41				
146700.00	13983.24	6.00	0.16	0.29	0.94

Table 13: DUR: Joint Significance Test of Pre-Treatment Interactions

Res.Df	RSS	Df	Sum of Sq	F	Pr(F)
15097.00	1768.13				
15092.00	1767.14	5.00	0.99	1.70	0.13

Table 14: AUS: Regression Results from Placebo Test

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> |t|)
(Intercept)	0.19	0.01	22.80	0.00
placebo_event_time-4	-0.06	0.01	-6.88	0.00
placebo_event_time-3	-0.05	0.01	-5.07	0.00
placebo_event_time-2	-0.04	0.01	-4.54	0.00
placebo_event_time-1	-0.08	0.01	-9.07	0.00
placebo_event_time0	-0.09	0.01	-10.12	0.00
placebo_event_time1	-0.09	0.01	-10.42	0.00
gentrifier	-0.02	0.02	-0.99	0.32
placebo_event_time-4:gentrifier	-0.00	0.02	-0.02	0.98
placebo_event_time-3:gentrifier	0.01	0.02	0.25	0.80
placebo_event_time-2:gentrifier	0.01	0.02	0.38	0.71
placebo_event_time-1:gentrifier	0.01	0.02	0.52	0.60
placebo_event_time0:gentrifier	0.00	0.02	0.20	0.85
placebo_event_time1:gentrifier	0.01	0.02	0.34	0.74

Table 15: DUR: Regression Results from Placebo Test

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> |t|)
(Intercept)	0.17	0.02	9.15	0.00
placebo_event_time-3	-0.08	0.02	-3.64	0.00
placebo_event_time-2	0.05	0.02	2.29	0.02
placebo_event_time-1	-0.04	0.02	-1.72	0.09
placebo_event_time0	0.05	0.02	2.45	0.01
placebo_event_time1	-0.07	0.02	-3.47	0.00
gentrifier	0.08	0.05	1.78	0.07
placebo_event_time-3:gentrifier	-0.08	0.05	-1.60	0.11
placebo_event_time-2:gentrifier	-0.07	0.05	-1.30	0.19
placebo_event_time-1:gentrifier	-0.09	0.05	-1.81	0.07
placebo_event_time0:gentrifier	-0.06	0.05	-1.22	0.22
placebo_event_time1:gentrifier	-0.10	0.05	-2.09	0.04

D Regression Tables for Main Results

Table 16: AUS: Voting Around Move by Gentrifier Status

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> |t|)
(Intercept)	0.19	0.01	19.32	0.00
factor(event_time)-6	-0.06	0.01	-5.83	0.00
factor(event_time)-5	-0.05	0.01	-4.29	0.00
factor(event_time)-4	-0.04	0.01	-3.85	0.00
factor(event_time)-3	-0.08	0.01	-7.68	0.00
factor(event_time)-2	-0.09	0.01	-8.57	0.00
factor(event_time)-1	-0.09	0.01	-8.83	0.00
factor(event_time)0	-0.05	0.01	-5.50	0.00
factor(event_time)1	-0.02	0.01	-2.32	0.02
factor(event_time)2	-0.03	0.01	-3.29	0.00
factor(event_time)3	0.01	0.01	0.83	0.41
factor(event_time)4	-0.01	0.01	-1.41	0.16
factor(event_time)5	0.04	0.01	4.34	0.00
factor(event_time)6	0.02	0.01	1.65	0.10
factor(event_time)7	0.09	0.01	9.00	0.00
factor(event_time)8	-0.01	0.01	-0.73	0.47
gentrifier	-0.02	0.02	-0.84	0.40
factor(event_time)-6:gentrifier	-0.00	0.02	-0.02	0.99
factor(event_time)-5:gentrifier	0.01	0.02	0.22	0.83
factor(event_time)-4:gentrifier	0.01	0.02	0.32	0.75
factor(event_time)-3:gentrifier	0.01	0.02	0.44	0.66
factor(event_time)-2:gentrifier	0.00	0.02	0.17	0.87
factor(event_time)-1:gentrifier	0.01	0.02	0.28	0.78
factor(event_time)0:gentrifier	0.02	0.02	1.00	0.32
factor(event_time)1:gentrifier	0.01	0.02	0.59	0.56
factor(event_time)2:gentrifier	0.03	0.02	1.46	0.15
factor(event_time)3:gentrifier	0.03	0.02	1.34	0.18
factor(event_time)4:gentrifier	0.02	0.02	1.13	0.26
factor(event_time)5:gentrifier	0.05	0.02	2.36	0.02
factor(event_time)6:gentrifier	0.05	0.02	2.33	0.02
factor(event_time)7:gentrifier	0.06	0.02	2.49	0.01
factor(event_time)8:gentrifier	0.02	0.02	0.95	0.34

Table 17: DUR: Voting Around Move by Gentrifier Status

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> |t|)
(Intercept)	0.17	0.02	8.09	0.00
factor(event_time)-5	-0.08	0.02	-3.22	0.00
factor(event_time)-4	0.05	0.03	2.02	0.04
factor(event_time)-3	-0.04	0.02	-1.52	0.13
factor(event_time)-2	0.05	0.02	2.16	0.03
factor(event_time)-1	-0.07	0.02	-3.07	0.00
factor(event_time)0	0.09	0.02	3.73	0.00
factor(event_time)1	-0.01	0.02	-0.68	0.50
factor(event_time)2	0.07	0.02	3.18	0.00
factor(event_time)3	-0.01	0.02	-0.59	0.55
factor(event_time)4	0.07	0.02	2.80	0.01
factor(event_time)5	-0.05	0.02	-2.13	0.03
factor(event_time)6	0.06	0.03	2.28	0.02
gentrifier	0.08	0.05	1.58	0.11
factor(event_time)-5:gentrifier	-0.08	0.06	-1.42	0.16
factor(event_time)-4:gentrifier	-0.07	0.06	-1.15	0.25
factor(event_time)-3:gentrifier	-0.09	0.05	-1.60	0.11
factor(event_time)-2:gentrifier	-0.06	0.06	-1.08	0.28
factor(event_time)-1:gentrifier	-0.10	0.05	-1.85	0.06
factor(event_time)0:gentrifier	-0.00	0.05	-0.07	0.94
factor(event_time)1:gentrifier	-0.04	0.05	-0.77	0.44
factor(event_time)2:gentrifier	-0.01	0.05	-0.09	0.92
factor(event_time)3:gentrifier	-0.04	0.05	-0.70	0.49
factor(event_time)4:gentrifier	-0.01	0.05	-0.12	0.90
factor(event_time)5:gentrifier	-0.03	0.05	-0.47	0.64
factor(event_time)6:gentrifier	-0.02	0.06	-0.31	0.76

Table 18: Change in Probability of Voting in a Local Election After Moving

Austin: Full Sample

	Voted Local
Post-Move	0.027 (0.003)***
% Unemployed	0.063 (0.055)
Multi-unit Property	−0.015 (0.002)***
% Nonwhite	−0.011 (0.019)
% Poverty	−0.034 (0.013)**
Population	0.000 (0.000)**
% College	−0.004 (0.021)
Crime Rate	0.000 (0.000)
Gentrifier X Post-Move	0.026 (0.004)***
Num. obs.	379872
Num. groups: vuid	75075
Num. groups: year	8
R^2 (full model)	0.452
R^2 (proj model)	0.001
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.317
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	0.001

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Austin: White Sample

	Voted Local
Post-Move	0.029 (0.003)***
% Unemployed	0.060 (0.055)
Multi-unit Property	−0.015 (0.002)***
% Nonwhite	−0.011 (0.019)
% Poverty	−0.035 (0.013)**
Population	0.000 (0.000)**
% College	−0.004 (0.021)
Crime Rate	0.000 (0.000)
Gentrifier (White) X Post-Move	0.029 (0.004)***
Num. obs.	379872
Num. groups: vuid	75075
Num. groups: year	8
R^2 (full model)	0.452
R^2 (proj model)	0.001
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.317
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	0.001

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Austin: Non-white Sample

	Voted Local
Post-Move	0.036 (0.003)***
% Unemployed	0.055 (0.056)
Multi-unit Property	−0.014 (0.002)***
% Nonwhite	−0.008 (0.019)
% Poverty	−0.035 (0.013)**
Population	0.000 (0.000)**
% College	−0.006 (0.021)
Crime Rate	0.000 (0.000)
Gentrifier (Nonwhite) X Post-Move	0.004 (0.005)
Num. obs.	379872
Num. groups: vuid	75075
Num. groups: year	8
R^2 (full model)	0.452
R^2 (proj model)	0.001
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.317
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	0.001

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Durham: Full Sample

	Voted Local
Post-Move	0.065 (0.009)***
% Unemployed	0.171 (0.095)
Multi-unit Prop.	−0.032 (0.007)***
% Nonwhite	0.084 (0.028)**
% Poverty	0.022 (0.035)
Population	−0.000 (0.000)***
% College	0.117 (0.033)***
Gentrifier X Post-Move	0.001 (0.012)
Num. obs.	33053
Num. groups: ncid	13156
Num. groups: year	4
R^2 (full model)	0.697
R^2 (proj model)	0.007
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.497
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	0.006

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Durham: White Sample

	Voted Local
Post-Move	0.059 (0.008)***
% Unemployed	0.172 (0.095)
Multi-unit Prop.	−0.032 (0.007)***
% Nonwhite	0.076 (0.028)**
% Poverty	0.016 (0.033)
Population	−0.000 (0.000)***
% College	0.116 (0.032)***
Gentrifier (White) X Post-Move	0.048 (0.021)*
Num. obs.	33053
Num. groups: ncid	13156
Num. groups: year	4
R^2 (full model)	0.697
R^2 (proj model)	0.008
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.497
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	0.007

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Durham: Non-white Sample

	Voted Local
Post-Move	0.071 (0.009)***
% Unemployed	0.173 (0.095)
Multi-unit Prop.	−0.031 (0.007)***
% Nonwhite	0.079 (0.028)**
% Poverty	0.037 (0.034)
Population	−0.000 (0.000)***
% College	0.115 (0.032)***
Gentrifier (Nonwhite) X Post-Move	−0.029 (0.013)*
Num. obs.	33053
Num. groups: ncid	13156
Num. groups: year	4
R^2 (full model)	0.697
R^2 (proj model)	0.007
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.497
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	0.007

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 19: Predicted Probability of Voting in a Local Election by Resident Type

Gentrifiers vs. Long-Term Residents

Austin

	Voted Local
(Intercept)	0.047 (0.058)
Gentrifier Post-Move	0.066 (0.005)***
Female	0.011 (0.003)***
Age	0.003 (0.000)***
% Unemployed	0.353 (0.169)*
Black Voter	−0.036 (0.008)***
Latino Voter	−0.052 (0.006)***
Multi-unit Property	−0.069 (0.006)***
% Nonwhite	−0.029 (0.051)
% Poverty	−0.008 (0.043)
Move Year 2015	0.004 (0.004)
Move Year 2017	−0.032 (0.004)***
Move Year 2018	−0.014 (0.004)***
Move Year 2019	−0.010 (0.006)
Move Year 2020	0.027 (0.007)***
Move Year 2021	−0.016 (0.007)*
Move Year 2022	−0.065 (0.011)***
Population	−0.000 (0.000)***
% College	0.102 (0.055)
Homebuyer	0.011 (0.004)**
Crime Rate	0.000 (0.000)
Num. obs.	279241
R^2 (full model)	0.040
R^2 (proj model)	
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.040
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Durham

	Voted Local
(Intercept)	0.341 (0.074)***
Gentrifier Post-Move	0.045 (0.010)***
Female	0.042 (0.005)***
Age	0.005 (0.001)***
% Unemployed	0.332 (0.221)
Black Voter	−0.107 (0.019)***
Latino Voter	−0.105 (0.015)***
Multi-unit Prop.	−0.118 (0.011)***
% Nonwhite	−0.284 (0.077)***
% Poverty	0.058 (0.078)
Move Year 2017	−0.064 (0.010)***
Move Year 2018	−0.030 (0.016)
Move Year 2019	−0.084 (0.011)***
Move Year 2020	−0.103 (0.020)***
Move Year 2021	−0.118 (0.020)***
Move Year 2022	−0.215 (0.055)***
Moved from Out of County	0.013 (0.009)
Population	−0.000 (0.000)**
% College	−0.022 (0.084)
Homebuyer	0.008 (0.013)
Num. obs.	24325
R^2 (full model)	0.111
R^2 (proj model)	
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.111
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Gentrifiers vs. Affluent-area Residents

Austin

	Voted Local
(Intercept)	0.049 (0.034)
Gentrifier Post-Move	0.077 (0.006)***
Female	0.002 (0.002)
Age	0.003 (0.000)***
% Unemployed	0.239 (0.113)*
Black Voter	−0.018 (0.007)**
Latino Voter	−0.035 (0.004)***
Multi-unit Property	−0.053 (0.004)***
% Nonwhite	−0.032 (0.032)
% Poverty	−0.078 (0.020)***
Pseudo Move Year 2015	0.008 (0.004)*
Pseudo Move Year 2017	−0.032 (0.004)***
Pseudo Move Year 2018	−0.016 (0.004)***
PseudoMove Year 2019	−0.017 (0.005)***
Pseudo Move Year 2020	0.017 (0.006)**
Pseudo Move Year 2021	−0.024 (0.006)***
Pseudo Move Year 2022	−0.070 (0.010)***
Population	−0.000 (0.000)***
% College	0.089 (0.033)**
Homebuyer	0.014 (0.004)***
Crime Rate	0.000 (0.000)
Num. obs.	280701
R^2 (full model)	0.042
R^2 (proj model)	
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.042
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Durham

	Voted Local
(Intercept)	−0.017 (0.068)
Gentrifier Post-Move	0.042 (0.018)*
Female	0.023 (0.006)***
Age	0.005 (0.000)***
% Unemployed	0.064 (0.263)
Black Voter	−0.024 (0.021)
Latino Voter	−0.067 (0.015)***
Multi-unit Prop.	−0.098 (0.011)***
% Nonwhite	0.105 (0.057)
% Poverty	−0.036 (0.090)
Pseudo Move Year 2017	−0.059 (0.013)***
Pseudo Move Year 2018	−0.021 (0.018)
Pseudo Move Year 2019	−0.084 (0.014)***
Pseudo Move Year 2020	−0.104 (0.023)***
Pseudo Move Year 2021	−0.119 (0.019)***
Moved from Out of County	0.043 (0.012)***
Population	−0.000 (0.000)***
% College	0.251 (0.066)***
Homebuyer	0.020 (0.013)
Num. obs.	24175
R^2 (full model)	0.075
R^2 (proj model)	
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.075
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 20: Predicted Local Turnout Among Gentrifiers by % Black-Latino of Post-Move Tract

Among Austin Gentrifiers

	Voted Local
(Intercept)	0.201 (0.065)**
% Black-Latino	0.242 (0.092)**
Female	0.000 (0.003)
Age	0.001 (0.000)**
% Unemployed	0.125 (0.164)
% Poverty	0.049 (0.044)
Population	−0.000 (0.000)*
% College	0.128 (0.070)
Multi-unit Property	−0.050 (0.006)***
% Nonwhite	−0.237 (0.092)*
crime_rate	−0.000 (0.000)
black	−0.018 (0.012)
latino	−0.049 (0.006)***
homebuyer	0.009 (0.004)*
Year: 2017	−0.051 (0.011)***
Year: 2018	−0.179 (0.012)***
Year: 2019	−0.019 (0.011)
Year: 2020	0.034 (0.014)*
Year: 2021	0.104 (0.014)***
Year: 2022	−0.099 (0.015)***
Move Year: 2015	0.025 (0.007)***
Move Year: 2017	−0.051 (0.007)***
Move Year: 2018	−0.027 (0.008)***
Move Year: 2019	−0.072 (0.008)***
Move Year: 2020	−0.026 (0.009)**
Move Year: 2021	−0.071 (0.009)***
Num. obs.	112251
R^2 (full model)	0.069
R^2 (proj model)	
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.069
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Among Durham Gentrifiers

	Voted Local
(Intercept)	0.303 (0.091)**
% Black-Latino	0.485 (0.128)***
Female	0.019 (0.008)*
Age	0.003 (0.001)***
% Unemployed	0.112 (0.283)
% Poverty	0.011 (0.095)
Population	−0.000 (0.000)***
% College	0.161 (0.102)
% Nonwhite	−0.562 (0.131)***
Multi-unit Prop.	−0.089 (0.014)***
Out of County Mover	0.022 (0.010)*
Black	−0.126 (0.017)***
Latino	−0.101 (0.027)***
Year: 2017	0.091 (0.019)***
Year: 2019	0.057 (0.010)***
Homebuyer	0.010 (0.014)
Move Year: 2017	−0.101 (0.018)***
Move Year: 2018	−0.008 (0.031)
Move Year: 2019	−0.101 (0.022)***
Move Year: 2020	−0.109 (0.030)***
Num. obs.	9188
R^2 (full model)	0.099
R^2 (proj model)	
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.097
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

E Regression Tables for Survey Results

Table 21: Gentrifier Perceptions of Neighborhood Conditions

Austin

	Model 1
Intercept	14.204 (0.401)***
Gentrifier	−0.733 (0.370)*
Age	−0.002 (0.036)
Female	−0.086 (0.108)
Renter	0.182 (0.158)
Tract % College	−0.001 (0.005)
Tract % Nonwhite	−1.959 (0.308)***
Black	−0.208 (0.246)
Latino	−0.197 (0.270)
Tract Median HH Income	0.000 (0.000)***
Tract Pop.	0.000 (0.000)***
Survey Year: 2016	−0.325 (0.170)
Survey Year: 2017	−0.258 (0.163)
Survey Year: 2018	−0.254 (0.310)
Survey Year: 2019	−0.210 (0.327)
R^2	0.109
Adj. R^2	0.105
Num. obs.	3202
RMSE	3.006

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Durham

	Model 1
Intercept	11.800 (0.498)***
Gentrifier	−0.286 (0.217)
Age	−0.051 (0.044)
Female	−0.408 (0.120)***
Renter	−0.294 (0.128)*
Tract % College	3.854 (0.522)***
Tract % Nonwhite	−2.117 (0.441)***
Black	−0.118 (0.134)
Latino	−0.399 (0.474)
Tract Median HH Income	0.000 (0.000)
Tract Pop.	0.000 (0.000)***
Survey Year: 2017	0.122 (0.241)
Survey Year: 2018	−0.293 (0.226)
Survey Year: 2020	0.062 (0.222)
Survey Year: 2021	0.171 (0.215)
Survey Year: 2022	−0.244 (0.225)
R^2	0.164
Adj. R^2	0.159
Num. obs.	2925
RMSE	3.228

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 22: Gentrifier Likelihood of Contacting City Government

Austin

	Model 1
Intercept	0.992 (0.042)***
Gentrifier	0.065 (0.032)*
Age	−0.002 (0.004)
Female	0.010 (0.013)
Renter	−0.102 (0.019)***
Tract % College	0.001 (0.000)*
Tract % Nonwhite	0.064 (0.035)
Black	−0.063 (0.028)*
Latino	−0.074 (0.038)
Tract Median HH Income	−0.000 (0.000)**
Tract Pop.	−0.000 (0.000)*
Tract % Unemployed	0.201 (0.170)
Year: 2016	−0.003 (0.003)
Year: 2017	−0.142 (0.014)***
Year 2018	−0.284 (0.030)***
Year: 2019	−0.244 (0.034)***
R^2	0.172
Adj. R^2	0.168
Num. obs.	3242
RMSE	0.357

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Durham

	Model 1
Intercept	0.358 (0.081)***
Gentrifier	0.111 (0.032)***
Age	0.004 (0.006)
Female	0.000 (0.017)
Renter	−0.100 (0.018)***
Tract % College	0.297 (0.078)***
Tract % Nonwhite	0.265 (0.066)***
Black	−0.007 (0.019)
Latino	−0.050 (0.055)
Tract Median HH Income	0.000 (0.000)
Tract Pop.	−0.000 (0.000)***
Tract % Unemployed	0.223 (0.389)
Survey Year: 2017	0.051 (0.035)
Survey Year: 2018	0.019 (0.033)
Survey Year: 2020	0.037 (0.033)
Survey Year: 2021	0.007 (0.033)
Survey Year: 2022	−0.069 (0.032)*
R^2	0.037
Adj. R^2	0.033
Num. obs.	3346
RMSE	0.491

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 23: White Gentrifier Perceptions of Neighborhood Conditions

Austin

	Model 1
Intercept	14.150 (0.354)***
Gentrifier (White)	−0.665 (0.413)
Age	0.021 (0.032)
Female	−0.140 (0.097)
Renter	0.250 (0.128)
Tract % College	−0.003 (0.004)
Tract % Nonwhite	−1.983 (0.261)***
Black	−0.132 (0.150)
Latino	−0.451 (0.184)*
Tract Median HH Income	0.000 (0.000)***
Tract Pop.	0.000 (0.000)***
Survey Year: 2016	−0.444 (0.155)**
Survey Year: 2017	−0.294 (0.150)*
Survey Year: 2018	−0.469 (0.263)
Survey Year: 2019	−0.509 (0.274)
R^2	0.111
Adj. R^2	0.108
Num. obs.	4239
RMSE	3.105

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Durham

	Model 1
Intercept	11.495 (0.634)***
Gentrifier (White)	−0.619 (0.276)*
Age	0.017 (0.059)
Female	−0.355 (0.154)*
Renter	−0.214 (0.173)
Tract % College	3.945 (0.653)***
Tract % Nonwhite	−2.099 (0.590)***
Black	−0.296 (0.182)
Latino	−0.504 (0.755)
Tract Median HH Income	−0.000 (0.000)
Tract Pop.	0.000 (0.000)***
Survey Year: 2017	0.019 (0.310)
Survey Year: 2018	−0.175 (0.299)
Survey Year: 2020	0.192 (0.294)
Survey Year: 2021	0.187 (0.278)
Survey Year: 2022	−0.037 (0.300)
R^2	0.180
Adj. R^2	0.173
Num. obs.	1712
RMSE	3.160

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 24: White Gentrifier Likelihood of Contacting City Government

Austin

	Model 1
Intercept	1.000 (0.036)***
Gentrifier (White)	0.058 (0.032)
Age	−0.001 (0.004)
Female	0.013 (0.011)
Renter	−0.084 (0.015)***
Tract % College	0.001 (0.000)*
Tract % Nonwhite	0.060 (0.028)*
Black	−0.032 (0.017)
Latino	0.001 (0.024)
Tract Median HH Income	−0.000 (0.000)**
Tract Pop.	−0.000 (0.000)*
Tract % Unemployed	0.211 (0.151)
Year: 2016	0.001 (0.003)
Year: 2017	−0.152 (0.012)***
Year 2018	−0.299 (0.025)***
Year: 2019	−0.269 (0.028)***
R^2	0.156
Adj. R^2	0.153
Num. obs.	4324
RMSE	0.367

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Durham

	Model 1
Intercept	0.384 (0.109)***
Gentrifier (White)	0.135 (0.040)***
Age	0.005 (0.009)
Female	−0.004 (0.022)
Renter	−0.119 (0.025)***
Tract % College	0.345 (0.106)**
Tract % Nonwhite	0.308 (0.091)***
Black	0.041 (0.025)
Latino	−0.009 (0.081)
Tract Median HH Income	0.000 (0.000)
Tract Pop.	−0.000 (0.000)***
Tract % Unemployed	0.262 (0.509)
Survey Year: 2017	0.015 (0.047)
Survey Year: 2018	−0.030 (0.044)
Survey Year: 2020	−0.036 (0.044)
Survey Year: 2021	−0.063 (0.042)
Survey Year: 2022	−0.123 (0.042)**
R^2	0.045
Adj. R^2	0.037
Num. obs.	1914
RMSE	0.487

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 25: Non-white Gentrifier Perceptions of Neighborhood Conditions

Austin

	Model 1
Intercept	13.888 (0.281)***
Gentrifier (Non-white)	−0.029 (0.154)
Age	0.011 (0.024)
Female	−0.246 (0.077)**
Renter	−0.093 (0.095)
Tract % College	−0.000 (0.003)
Tract % Nonwhite	−1.934 (0.205)***
Black	−0.073 (0.241)
Latino	−0.221 (0.224)
Tract Median HH Income	0.000 (0.000)***
Tract Pop.	0.000 (0.000)***
Survey Year: 2016	−0.230 (0.124)
Survey Year: 2017	−0.092 (0.121)
Survey Year: 2018	−0.154 (0.207)
Survey Year: 2019	−0.297 (0.215)
R^2	0.105
Adj. R^2	0.104
Num. obs.	6666
RMSE	3.115

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Durham

	Model 1
Intercept	11.692 (0.484)***
Gentrifier (Non-white)	0.093 (0.208)
Age	−0.022 (0.043)
Female	−0.413 (0.118)***
Renter	−0.298 (0.126)*
Tract % College	3.689 (0.512)***
Tract % Nonwhite	−2.218 (0.432)***
Black	−0.107 (0.132)
Latino	−0.450 (0.503)
Tract Median HH Income	0.000 (0.000)
Tract Pop.	0.000 (0.000)***
Survey Year: 2017	0.130 (0.230)
Survey Year: 2018	−0.161 (0.215)
Survey Year: 2020	0.083 (0.214)
Survey Year: 2021	0.173 (0.206)
Survey Year: 2022	−0.225 (0.216)
R^2	0.166
Adj. R^2	0.162
Num. obs.	3033
RMSE	3.219

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 26: Non-white Gentrifier Likelihood of Contacting City Government

Austin

	Model 1
Intercept	1.016 (0.029)***
Gentrifier (Non-white)	−0.029 (0.019)
Age	−0.003 (0.003)
Female	0.006 (0.009)
Renter	−0.079 (0.011)***
Tract % College	0.001 (0.000)*
Tract % Nonwhite	0.057 (0.022)*
Black	−0.066 (0.028)*
Latino	0.027 (0.029)
Tract Median HH Income	−0.000 (0.000)***
Tract Pop.	−0.000 (0.000)*
Tract % Unemployed	0.101 (0.114)
Year: 2016	0.000 (0.002)
Year: 2017	−0.147 (0.010)***
Year 2018	−0.304 (0.020)***
Year: 2019	−0.259 (0.022)***
R^2	0.155
Adj. R^2	0.153
Num. obs.	6814
RMSE	0.364

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Durham

	Model 1
Intercept	0.400 (0.079)***
Gentrifier (Non-white)	−0.003 (0.032)
Age	0.001 (0.006)
Female	−0.004 (0.017)
Renter	−0.107 (0.018)***
Tract % College	0.285 (0.077)***
Tract % Nonwhite	0.245 (0.065)***
Black	−0.003 (0.018)
Latino	−0.046 (0.062)
Tract Median HH Income	0.000 (0.000)
Tract Pop.	−0.000 (0.000)***
Tract % Unemployed	0.259 (0.383)
Survey Year: 2017	0.067 (0.035)
Survey Year: 2018	0.035 (0.032)
Survey Year: 2020	0.052 (0.033)
Survey Year: 2021	0.024 (0.032)
Survey Year: 2022	−0.050 (0.032)
R^2	0.032
Adj. R^2	0.028
Num. obs.	3441
RMSE	0.492

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

F Details on BISG Method

Because the Texas voter file lacks race information, I use Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding (BISG), which combines surname-based priors with Census geographic demographics to impute voter race and has been shown to outperform alternative methods (McCartan et al. 2025).

I implement BISG using the wru package with voter surname and geographic information, obtaining race probability estimates for 92.9% of voters, which I code using the highest-probability category.

Table 27: AUS: Sample by Race

Racial Category	Voters	Percent
White	345700	73.42%
Black	13081	2.78%
Latino	87952	18.68%
Asian	23822	5.06%
Other	326	0.07%
Total	470881	100.00%

G Survey Data

Both cities conducted annual mailed or online community surveys through ETC Research, with Austin using a stratified design and post-stratification weights (9,959 respondents, 2014–2019) and Durham surveying 5,253 residents from 2015–2022.

G.1 Key Variables

Gentrifiers: Geocoded respondents who live in gentrifying tracts and report income > $80K). Appendix H).

Neighborhood Conditions: Four-item satisfaction index (1–5 each; range 4–20; Austin mean 14.29, Durham 13.42) on cleanliness, sidewalks, streets, safety (Durham uses overall quality of life instead of overall cleanliness of neighborhood).

Table 28: Community Survey Sample Descriptives and Aggregate-Level Factors

Community Survey Sample Descriptives by Resident Type

	Count	Age 1	Age 2	Age 3	Age 4	White	Female
Austin Community Survey							
Gentrifier	129	10.9	44.2	33.3	11.6	80.6	48.8
Affluent Resident	3553	12.4	30.0	42.0	15.1	74.8	45.6
Long-Term Resident	320	15.6	26.3	37.5	20.3	47.8	59.4
Durham Resident Survey							
Gentrifier	170	31.2	25.8	35.5	7.5	61.8	50.6
Affluent Resident	1036	17.3	25.2	45.5	12.0	58.4	46.8
Long-Term Resident	154	40.0	14.9	29.7	15.8	37.0	59.7

Notes: Age bins for Austin are Under 24, 25–44, 45–64, and 65+; Durham age bins are 18–34, 35–44, 45–64, and 65+.

H Analyses with Alternative Tract-level Characteristics

Influence of Aggregate-Level Factors on Turnout

Among Austin Gentrifiers

	Voted Local
(Intercept)	0.201 (0.065)**
% Black-Latino	0.242 (0.092)**
Female	0.000 (0.003)
Age	0.001 (0.000)**
% Unemployed	0.125 (0.164)
% Poverty	0.049 (0.044)
crime_rate	−0.000 (0.000)
Population	−0.000 (0.000)*
% College	0.128 (0.070)
Multi-unit Property	−0.050 (0.006)***
% Nonwhite	−0.237 (0.092)*
black	−0.018 (0.012)
latino	−0.049 (0.006)***
homebuyer	0.009 (0.004)*
Year: 2017	−0.051 (0.011)***
Year: 2018	−0.179 (0.012)***
Year: 2019	−0.019 (0.011)
Year: 2020	0.034 (0.014)*
Year: 2021	0.104 (0.014)***
Year: 2022	−0.099 (0.015)***
Move Year: 2015	0.025 (0.007)***
Move Year: 2017	−0.051 (0.007)***
Move Year: 2018	−0.027 (0.008)***
Move Year: 2019	−0.072 (0.008)***
Move Year: 2020	−0.026 (0.009)**
Move Year: 2021	−0.071 (0.009)***
Num. obs.	112251
R^2 (full model)	0.069
R^2 (proj model)	
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.069
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Among Durham Gentrifiers

	Voted Local
(Intercept)	0.303 (0.091)**
% Black-Latino	0.485 (0.128)***
Female	0.019 (0.008)*
Age	0.003 (0.001)***
% Unemployed	0.112 (0.283)
% Poverty	0.011 (0.095)
Population	−0.000 (0.000)***
% College	0.161 (0.102)
% Nonwhite	−0.562 (0.131)***
Multi-unit Prop.	−0.089 (0.014)***
Out of County Mover	0.022 (0.010)*
Black	−0.126 (0.017)***
Latino	−0.101 (0.027)***
Year: 2017	0.091 (0.019)***
Year: 2019	0.057 (0.010)***
Homebuyer	0.010 (0.014)
Move Year: 2017	−0.101 (0.018)***
Move Year: 2018	−0.008 (0.031)
Move Year: 2019	−0.101 (0.022)***
Move Year: 2020	−0.109 (0.030)***
Num. obs.	9188
R^2 (full model)	0.099
R^2 (proj model)	
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.097
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Figure 6: Aggregate Tract Characteristics and Predicted Local Turnout Among Gentrifiers





Figure 7: % Non-white in Post-Move Tract and Predicted Local Turnout Among Gentrifiers



Figure 8: % Black in Post-Move Tract and Predicted Local Turnout Among Gentrifiers



Figure 9: % Latino in Post-Move Tract and Predicted Local Turnout Among Gentrifiers

Table 29: Predicted Local Turnout Among Gentrifiers Conditional on % Nonwhite of Post-Move Tract

Among Austin Gentrifiers

	Voted Local
(Intercept)	0.278 (0.058)***
% Nonwhite	−0.064 (0.061)
Female	0.000 (0.003)
Age	0.001 (0.000)**
% Unemployed	0.164 (0.160)
% Poverty	0.029 (0.046)
Population	−0.000 (0.000)**
% College	0.029 (0.061)
Multi-unit Property	−0.050 (0.006)***
crime_rate	−0.000 (0.000)
black	−0.018 (0.013)
latino	−0.049 (0.006)***
homebuyer	0.009 (0.004)*
Year: 2017	−0.051 (0.011)***
Year: 2018	−0.176 (0.012)***
Year: 2019	−0.015 (0.011)
Year: 2020	0.037 (0.014)**
Year: 2021	0.109 (0.014)***
Year: 2022	−0.093 (0.015)***
Move Year: 2015	0.025 (0.007)***
Move Year: 2017	−0.051 (0.007)***
Move Year: 2018	−0.027 (0.008)***
Move Year: 2019	−0.073 (0.008)***
Move Year: 2020	−0.027 (0.010)**
Move Year: 2021	−0.071 (0.009)***
Num. obs.	112251
R^2 (full model)	0.068
R^2 (proj model)	
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.068
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Among Durham Gentrifiers

	Voted Local
(Intercept)	0.433 (0.038)***
% Nonwhite	−0.179 (0.060)**
Female	0.019 (0.008)*
Age	0.003 (0.001)***
% Unemployed	0.242 (0.266)
% Poverty	−0.089 (0.093)
Population	−0.000 (0.000)***
Multi-unit Prop.	−0.097 (0.013)***
Move Year 2017	−0.102 (0.018)***
Move Year 2018	−0.008 (0.031)
Move Year 2019	−0.099 (0.022)***
Move Year 2020	−0.106 (0.030)***
Out of County Mover	0.020 (0.010)*
Black	−0.123 (0.017)***
Latino	−0.103 (0.027)***
Year: 2017	0.091 (0.018)***
Year: 2019	0.058 (0.011)***
Homebuyer	0.009 (0.014)
Num. obs.	9188
R^2 (full model)	0.097
R^2 (proj model)	
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.095
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 30: Predicted Local Turnout Among Gentrifiers Conditional on % Black of Post-Move Tract

Among Austin Gentrifiers

	Voted Local
(Intercept)	0.284 (0.061)***
% Black	0.171 (0.074)*
Female	−0.000 (0.003)
Age	0.001 (0.000)**
% Unemployed	0.138 (0.153)
% Poverty	0.027 (0.045)
Population	−0.000 (0.000)*
% College	0.027 (0.064)
Multi-unit Property	−0.050 (0.006)***
% Nonwhite	−0.107 (0.068)
Crime Rate	−0.000 (0.000)
Black Voter	−0.019 (0.013)
Latino Voter	−0.049 (0.006)***
Homebuyer	0.009 (0.004)*
Year: 2017	−0.052 (0.011)***
Year: 2018	−0.177 (0.012)***
Year: 2019	−0.017 (0.011)
Year: 2020	0.037 (0.014)**
Year: 2021	0.109 (0.014)***
Year: 2022	−0.093 (0.015)***
Move Year: 2015	0.025 (0.007)***
Move Year: 2017	−0.052 (0.007)***
Move Year: 2018	−0.027 (0.008)***
Move Year: 2019	−0.073 (0.008)***
Move Year: 2020	−0.027 (0.010)**
Move Year: 2021	−0.071 (0.009)***
Num. obs.	112251
R^2 (full model)	0.069
R^2 (proj model)	
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.069
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Among Durham Gentrifiers

	Voted Local
(Intercept)	0.413 (0.089)***
% Black	0.055 (0.090)
Female	0.019 (0.008)*
Age	0.003 (0.001)***
% Unemployed	0.202 (0.294)
% Poverty	−0.068 (0.093)
Population	−0.000 (0.000)***
% College	0.026 (0.092)
% Nonwhite	−0.206 (0.126)
Multi-unit Prop.	−0.096 (0.014)***
Out of County Mover	0.020 (0.010)
Black	−0.124 (0.017)***
Latino	−0.103 (0.027)***
Year: 2017	0.090 (0.019)***
Year: 2019	0.057 (0.011)***
Homebuyer	0.009 (0.014)
Move Year: 2017	−0.102 (0.018)***
Move Year: 2018	−0.008 (0.031)
Move Year: 2019	−0.100 (0.023)***
Move Year: 2020	−0.107 (0.029)***
Num. obs.	9188
R^2 (full model)	0.097
R^2 (proj model)	
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.095
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 31: Predicted Local Turnout Among Gentrifiers Conditional on % Latino of Post-Move Tract

Among Austin Gentrifiers

	Voted Local
(Intercept)	0.286 (0.068)***
% Latino	−0.021 (0.069)
Female	0.000 (0.003)
Age	0.001 (0.000)**
% Unemployed	0.164 (0.158)
% Poverty	0.027 (0.045)
Population	−0.000 (0.000)**
% College	0.021 (0.071)
Multi-unit Property	−0.050 (0.006)***
% Nonwhite	−0.055 (0.066)
crime_rate	−0.000 (0.000)
black	−0.018 (0.013)
latino	−0.049 (0.006)***
homebuyer	0.009 (0.004)*
Year: 2017	−0.051 (0.011)***
Year: 2018	−0.176 (0.012)***
Year: 2019	−0.015 (0.011)
Year: 2020	0.038 (0.014)**
Year: 2021	0.109 (0.014)***
Year: 2022	−0.093 (0.015)***
Move Year: 2015	0.025 (0.007)***
Move Year: 2017	−0.051 (0.007)***
Move Year: 2018	−0.027 (0.008)***
Move Year: 2019	−0.073 (0.008)***
Move Year: 2020	−0.027 (0.010)**
Move Year: 2021	−0.071 (0.009)***
Num. obs.	112251
R^2 (full model)	0.068
R^2 (proj model)	
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.068
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Among Durham Gentrifiers

	Voted Local
(Intercept)	0.432 (0.039)***
% Latino	0.060 (0.090)
Female	0.019 (0.008)*
Age	0.003 (0.001)***
% Unemployed	0.274 (0.260)
% Poverty	−0.100 (0.095)
Population	−0.000 (0.000)***
% Nonwhite	−0.190 (0.062)**
Multi-unit Prop.	−0.098 (0.013)***
Move Year 2017	−0.102 (0.018)***
Move Year 2018	−0.007 (0.031)
Move Year 2019	−0.099 (0.022)***
Move Year 2020	−0.106 (0.030)***
Out of County Mover	0.021 (0.010)*
Black	−0.122 (0.018)***
Latino	−0.103 (0.027)***
Year: 2017	0.092 (0.018)***
Year: 2019	0.058 (0.011)***
Homebuyer	0.010 (0.014)
Num. obs.	9188
R^2 (full model)	0.097
R^2 (proj model)	
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.095
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

I Federal Elections



Figure 10: Marginal Effects of Gentrifier Status on Voting in a Federal Election by Race

Table 32: Marginal Effects of Gentrifier Status on Voting in Federal Election by Race

Austin: Full

	Voted Federal
Post-Move	0.126 (0.005)***
% Unemployed	−0.133 (0.049)**
Multi-unit Property	−0.013 (0.004)***
% Nonwhite	−0.019 (0.016)
% Poverty	−0.028 (0.018)
Population	0.000 (0.000)
% College	−0.044 (0.016)**
Crime Rate	−0.000 (0.000)
GentrifierXPostMove	0.025 (0.008)**
Num. obs.	198895
Num. groups: vuid	74816
Num. groups: year	4
R^2 (full model)	0.667
R^2 (proj model)	0.011
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.467
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	0.011

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Durham: Full

	Voted Federal
Post-Move	0.098 (0.012)***
% Unemployed	−0.060 (0.133)
Multi-unit Prop.	−0.021 (0.009)*
% Nonwhite	0.012 (0.034)
% Poverty	−0.004 (0.044)
Population	−0.000 (0.000)
% College	−0.028 (0.033)
GentrifierXPostMove	0.004 (0.015)
Num. obs.	35843
Num. groups: ncid	13814
Num. groups: year	4
R^2 (full model)	0.705
R^2 (proj model)	0.005
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.519
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	0.005

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Austin: White

	Voted Federal
Post-Move	0.130 (0.005)***
% Unemployed	−0.138 (0.049)**
Multi-unit Property	−0.012 (0.004)***
% Nonwhite	−0.017 (0.015)
% Poverty	−0.028 (0.018)
Population	0.000 (0.000)
% College	−0.044 (0.016)**
Crime Rate	−0.000 (0.000)
Gentrifier(W)XPostMove	0.014 (0.008)
Num. obs.	198895
Num. groups: vuid	74816
Num. groups: year	4
R^2 (full model)	0.667
R^2 (proj model)	0.011
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.466
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	0.011

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Durham: White

	Voted Federal
Post-Move	0.095 (0.012)***
% Unemployed	−0.052 (0.133)
Multi-unit Prop.	−0.020 (0.009)*
% Nonwhite	0.008 (0.034)
% Poverty	−0.006 (0.043)
Population	−0.000 (0.000)
% College	−0.026 (0.034)
Gentrifier(W)XPostMove	0.037 (0.021)
Num. obs.	35843
Num. groups: ncid	13814
Num. groups: year	4
R^2 (full model)	0.705
R^2 (proj model)	0.005
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.519
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	0.005

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Austin: Non-white

	Voted Federal
Post-Move	0.130 (0.005)***
% Unemployed	−0.136 (0.049)**
Multi-unit Property	−0.012 (0.003)***
% Nonwhite	−0.017 (0.015)
% Poverty	−0.027 (0.018)
Population	0.000 (0.000)
% College	−0.045 (0.016)**
Crime Rate	−0.000 (0.000)
Gentrifier(NW)XPostMove	0.044 (0.013)***
Num. obs.	198895
Num. groups: vuid	74816
Num. groups: year	4
R^2 (full model)	0.667
R^2 (proj model)	0.011
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.467
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	0.011

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Durham: Non-white

	Voted Federal
Post-Move	0.102 (0.012)***
% Unemployed	−0.054 (0.133)
Multi-unit Prop.	−0.020 (0.009)*
% Nonwhite	0.011 (0.034)
% Poverty	0.003 (0.044)
Population	−0.000 (0.000)
% College	−0.029 (0.033)
Gentrifier(NW)XPost-Move	−0.018 (0.018)
Num. obs.	35843
Num. groups: ncid	13814
Num. groups: year	4
R^2 (full model)	0.705
R^2 (proj model)	0.005
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.519
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	0.005

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

J Results by Race of Gentrifier

Figure 11: Predicted Probability of Voting in a Local Election by Resident Type (White)



Figure 12: Predicted Probability of Voting in a Local Election by Resident Type (Non-white)

Table 33: Predicted Probability of Voting in a Local Election (White Respondents)

Gentrifiers vs. Long-Term Residents

Austin

	Voted Local
(Intercept)	0.126 (0.019)***
Gentrifier Post-Move (W)	0.066 (0.005)***
Female	0.011 (0.003)***
Age	0.004 (0.000)***
% Unemployed	0.311 (0.176)
Black Voter	−0.053 (0.011)***
Latino Voter	−0.062 (0.007)***
Multi-unit Property	−0.071 (0.006)***
% Nonwhite	−0.111 (0.023)***
% Poverty	−0.012 (0.046)
Move Year 2015	0.003 (0.004)
Move Year 2017	−0.027 (0.004)***
Move Year 2018	−0.012 (0.004)**
Move Year 2019	−0.005 (0.006)
Move Year 2020	0.031 (0.008)***
Move Year 2021	−0.010 (0.007)
Move Year 2022	−0.061 (0.011)***
Population	−0.000 (0.000)***
Homebuyer	0.004 (0.004)
Crime Rate	0.000 (0.000)
Num. obs.	248487
R^2 (full model)	0.044
R^2 (proj model)	
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.044
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Durham

	Voted Local
(Intercept)	0.297 (0.032)***
Gentrifier Post Move (W)	0.086 (0.020)***
Female	0.052 (0.007)***
Age	0.006 (0.001)***
% Unemployed	0.517 (0.278)
Black Voter	−0.078 (0.026)**
Latino Voter	−0.080 (0.014)***
Multi-unit Prop.	−0.146 (0.012)***
% Nonwhite	−0.316 (0.061)***
% Poverty	0.135 (0.111)
Move Year 2017	−0.054 (0.013)***
Move Year 2018	−0.039 (0.018)*
Move Year 2019	−0.084 (0.011)***
Move Year 2020	−0.111 (0.022)***
Move Year 2021	−0.112 (0.023)***
Move Year 2022	−0.193 (0.062)**
Moved from Out of County	−0.016 (0.014)
Population	−0.000 (0.000)**
Homebuyer	0.037 (0.022)
Num. obs.	17909
R^2 (full model)	0.125
R^2 (proj model)	
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.124
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Gentrifiers vs. Affluent-area Residents

Austin

	Voted Local
(Intercept)	0.111 (0.012)***
Gentrifier Post-Move (W)	0.081 (0.006)***
Female	0.002 (0.002)
Age	0.003 (0.000)***
% Unemployed	0.187 (0.105)
Black Voter	−0.018 (0.008)*
Latino Voter	−0.027 (0.004)***
Multi-unit Property	−0.056 (0.005)***
% Nonwhite	−0.101 (0.016)***
% Poverty	−0.062 (0.016)***
Pseudo Move Year 2015	0.007 (0.004)
Pseudo Move Year 2017	−0.027 (0.004)***
Pseudo Move Year 2018	−0.014 (0.004)**
PseudoMove Year 2019	−0.011 (0.004)*
Pseudo Move Year 2020	0.024 (0.006)***
Pseudo Move Year 2021	−0.015 (0.006)*
Pseudo Move Year 2022	−0.063 (0.010)***
Population	−0.000 (0.000)***
Homebuyer	0.007 (0.005)
Crime Rate	0.000 (0.000)
Num. obs.	249706
R^2 (full model)	0.046
R^2 (proj model)	
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.046
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Durham

	Voted Local
(Intercept)	0.135 (0.036)***
Gentrifier Post-Move (W)	0.176 (0.019)***
Female	0.026 (0.008)**
Age	0.005 (0.000)***
% Unemployed	0.234 (0.326)
Black Voter	0.104 (0.014)***
Latino Voter	−0.019 (0.016)
Multi-unit Prop.	−0.109 (0.016)***
% Nonwhite	−0.082 (0.043)
% Poverty	0.032 (0.108)
Pseudo Move Year 2017	−0.048 (0.015)**
Pseudo Move Year 2018	−0.030 (0.020)
Pseudo Move Year 2019	−0.085 (0.017)***
Pseudo Move Year 2020	−0.110 (0.027)***
Pseudo Move Year 2021	−0.113 (0.022)***
Moved from Out of County	−0.017 (0.015)
Population	−0.000 (0.000)**
Homebuyer	0.044 (0.023)
Num. obs.	17752
R^2 (full model)	0.107
R^2 (proj model)	
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.106
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 34: Predicted Probability of Voting in a Local Election (Nonwhite Respondents)

Gentrifiers vs. Long-Term Residents

Austin

	Voted Local
(Intercept)	0.103 (0.022)***
Gentrifier Post-Move (NW)	0.012 (0.010)
Female	0.018 (0.004)***
Age	0.004 (0.000)***
% Unemployed	0.349 (0.179)
Black Voter	−0.021 (0.009)*
Latino Voter	−0.043 (0.013)***
Multi-unit Property	−0.063 (0.007)***
% Nonwhite	−0.164 (0.024)***
% Poverty	−0.004 (0.052)
Move Year 2015	0.001 (0.004)
Move Year 2017	−0.014 (0.004)***
Move Year 2018	−0.002 (0.004)
Move Year 2019	0.008 (0.006)
Move Year 2020	0.019 (0.007)*
Move Year 2021	0.006 (0.007)
Move Year 2022	−0.037 (0.012)**
Population	−0.000 (0.000)***
Homebuyer	0.077 (0.008)***
Crime Rate	0.000 (0.000)
Num. obs.	169798
R^2 (full model)	0.050
R^2 (proj model)	
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.050
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Durham

	Voted Local
(Intercept)	0.244 (0.024)***
Gentrifier Post Move (NW)	0.005 (0.010)
Female	0.050 (0.006)***
Age	0.006 (0.000)***
% Unemployed	0.180 (0.172)
Black Voter	−0.075 (0.023)**
Latino Voter	−0.077 (0.020)***
Multi-unit Prop.	−0.110 (0.014)***
% Nonwhite	−0.263 (0.042)***
% Poverty	0.049 (0.063)
Move Year 2017	−0.044 (0.007)***
Move Year 2018	−0.024 (0.012)*
Move Year 2019	−0.050 (0.011)***
Move Year 2020	−0.071 (0.016)***
Move Year 2021	−0.077 (0.017)***
Move Year 2022	−0.179 (0.059)**
Moved from Out of County	0.042 (0.016)**
Population	−0.000 (0.000)*
Homebuyer	−0.012 (0.015)
Num. obs.	18836
R^2 (full model)	0.111
R^2 (proj model)	
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.111
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Gentrifiers vs. Affluent-area Residents

Austin

	Voted Local
(Intercept)	0.091 (0.012)***
Gentrifier Post-Move (NW)	0.024 (0.007)***
Female	0.005 (0.002)
Age	0.004 (0.000)***
% Unemployed	0.091 (0.088)
Black Voter	0.001 (0.007)
Latino Voter	−0.027 (0.007)***
Multi-unit Property	−0.046 (0.005)***
% Nonwhite	−0.136 (0.015)***
% Poverty	−0.061 (0.014)***
Pseudo Move Year 2015	0.007 (0.003)*
Pseudo Move Year 2017	−0.013 (0.004)***
Pseudo Move Year 2018	−0.003 (0.004)
PseudoMove Year 2019	0.002 (0.004)
Pseudo Move Year 2020	0.010 (0.006)
Pseudo Move Year 2021	0.000 (0.005)
Pseudo Move Year 2022	−0.039 (0.009)***
Population	−0.000 (0.000)***
Homebuyer	0.073 (0.008)***
Crime Rate	0.000 (0.000)
Num. obs.	170334
R^2 (full model)	0.043
R^2 (proj model)	
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.043
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Durham

	Voted Local
(Intercept)	0.090 (0.027)**
Gentrifier Post-Move (NW)	−0.068 (0.012)***
Female	0.024 (0.007)***
Age	0.005 (0.000)***
% Unemployed	−0.192 (0.198)
Black Voter	0.081 (0.014)***
Latino Voter	0.071 (0.018)***
Multi-unit Prop.	−0.072 (0.013)***
% Nonwhite	−0.057 (0.037)
% Poverty	−0.036 (0.062)
Pseudo Move Year 2017	−0.036 (0.010)***
Pseudo Move Year 2018	−0.011 (0.014)
Pseudo Move Year 2019	−0.044 (0.010)***
Pseudo Move Year 2020	−0.066 (0.017)***
Pseudo Move Year 2021	−0.072 (0.014)***
Moved from Out of County	0.047 (0.017)**
Population	−0.000 (0.000)**
Homebuyer	−0.006 (0.016)
Num. obs.	18660
R^2 (full model)	0.077
R^2 (proj model)	
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.076
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$



Figure 13: Predicted Local Turnout Among White Gentrifiers by % Black-Latino of Post-Move Tract



Figure 14: Predicted Local Turnout Among Nonwhite Gentrifiers by % Black-Latino of Post-Move Tract

Table 35: Predicted Local Turnout by % Black–Latino of Post-Move Tract

White Gentrifiers

Austin

	Voted Local
(Intercept)	0.191 (0.067)**
% Black-Latino	0.252 (0.108)*
Female	−0.000 (0.004)
Age	0.001 (0.000)***
% Unemployed	0.094 (0.169)
% Poverty	0.057 (0.046)
Population	−0.000 (0.000)*
% College	0.122 (0.073)
Multi-unit Property	−0.057 (0.007)***
% Nonwhite	−0.237 (0.104)*
crime_rate	−0.000 (0.000)
homebuyer	0.002 (0.005)
Year: 2017	−0.049 (0.012)***
Year: 2018	−0.186 (0.012)***
Year: 2019	−0.016 (0.012)
Year: 2020	0.033 (0.014)*
Year: 2021	0.113 (0.015)***
Year: 2022	−0.103 (0.016)***
Move Year: 2015	0.025 (0.009)**
Move Year: 2017	−0.049 (0.008)***
Move Year: 2018	−0.027 (0.009)**
Move Year: 2019	−0.073 (0.009)***
Move Year: 2020	−0.018 (0.010)
Move Year: 2021	−0.069 (0.009)***
Num. obs.	87759
R^2 (full model)	0.070
R^2 (proj model)	
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.070
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Durham

	Voted Local
(Intercept)	0.241 (0.132)
% Black-Latino	1.061 (0.183)***
Female	0.014 (0.016)
Age	0.001 (0.001)
% Unemployed	0.316 (0.417)
% Poverty	0.113 (0.171)
Population	−0.000 (0.000)**
% College	0.352 (0.147)*
% Nonwhite	−0.956 (0.210)***
Multi-unit Prop.	−0.139 (0.025)***
Out of County Mover	−0.008 (0.016)
Year: 2017	0.156 (0.034)***
Year: 2019	0.093 (0.018)***
Homebuyer	0.017 (0.024)
Move Year: 2017	−0.131 (0.030)***
Move Year: 2018	−0.033 (0.044)
Move Year: 2019	−0.147 (0.031)***
Move Year: 2020	−0.141 (0.049)**
Num. obs.	3823
R^2 (full model)	0.086
R^2 (proj model)	
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.082
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Nonwhite Gentrifiers

Austin

	Voted Local
(Intercept)	0.214 (0.076)**
% Black-Latino	0.216 (0.075)**
Female	0.003 (0.007)
Age	−0.001 (0.000)*
% Unemployed	0.222 (0.183)
% Poverty	0.018 (0.046)
Population	−0.000 (0.000)
% College	0.147 (0.076)
Multi-unit Property	−0.027 (0.009)**
% Nonwhite	−0.242 (0.077)**
crime_rate	−0.000 (0.000)
homebuyer	0.039 (0.008)***
Black	0.007 (0.014)
Latino	−0.025 (0.013)*
Year: 2017	−0.059 (0.017)***
Year: 2018	−0.148 (0.018)***
Year: 2019	−0.029 (0.016)
Year: 2020	0.037 (0.020)
Year: 2021	0.076 (0.018)***
Year: 2022	−0.083 (0.018)***
Move Year: 2015	0.026 (0.012)*
Move Year: 2017	−0.057 (0.012)***
Move Year: 2018	−0.022 (0.015)
Move Year: 2019	−0.068 (0.014)***
Move Year: 2020	−0.051 (0.022)*
Move Year: 2021	−0.075 (0.014)***
Num. obs.	24414
R^2 (full model)	0.062
R^2 (proj model)	
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.062
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Durham

	Voted Local
(Intercept)	0.175 (0.102)
% Black-Latino	0.131 (0.135)
Female	0.002 (0.011)
Age	0.004 (0.001)***
% Unemployed	0.054 (0.298)
% Poverty	−0.057 (0.053)
Population	−0.000 (0.000)*
% College	0.147 (0.106)
% Nonwhite	−0.161 (0.117)
Multi-unit Prop.	−0.050 (0.014)***
Out of County Mover	0.040 (0.017)*
Black	−0.113 (0.047)*
Latino	−0.086 (0.060)
Year: 2017	0.039 (0.017)*
Year: 2019	0.022 (0.011)*
Homebuyer	0.002 (0.017)
Move Year: 2017	−0.085 (0.018)***
Move Year: 2018	0.014 (0.031)
Move Year: 2019	−0.057 (0.022)*
Move Year: 2020	−0.053 (0.026)*
Num. obs.	4416
R^2 (full model)	0.067
R^2 (proj model)	
Adj. R^2 (full model)	0.063
Adj. R^2 (proj model)	

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$